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Abstract: Using a unique dataset of daily U.S. and U.K. price listings and the associated number of
clicks for precisely defined goods from a major shopping platform, we shed new light on how prices
are set in online markets, which have a number of special properties such as low search costs, low
costs of monitoring competitors’ prices, and low costs of nominal price adjustment. We document
that although online prices change more frequently than offline prices, they nevertheless exhibit
relatively long spells of fixed prices. By many metrics, such as large size and low synchronization of
price changes, considerable cross-sectional dispersion, and low sensitivity to predictable or unantic-
ipated changes in demand conditions, online prices are as imperfect as offline prices. Our findings
suggest a need for more research on the sources of price rigidities and dispersion, as well as on the
relative role of menu and search costs in online-pricing frictions.
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1 Introduction
Internet firms such as Google, Amazon, and eBay are revolutionizing the retail sector, as there has been an
explosion in the volume and coverage of goods and services sold online. In 2013, Amazon alone generated
$74.5 billion in revenue—approximately the revenue of Target Corporation, the second largest discount retailer
in the United States—and carried 230 million items for sale in the United States—nearly 30 times the number
sold by Walmart, the largest retailer in the world. While virtually nonexistent 15 years ago, according to the
New York Times, “[i]n the last three months of 2016, Americans spent $102.7 billion in online sales, which was
8.3 percent of the overall total of $1.24 trillion in retail sales.”1 The rise of e-commerce has been truly a global
phenomenon, and global e-commerce sales are expected to reach $4 trillion by 2020 (Statista 2016). While
visionaries of the internet age are utterly bold in their predictions, one can already exploit special properties
of online retail, such as seemingly low search costs, low costs of monitoring competitors’ prices, and low costs
of nominal price adjustment (Ellison and Ellison 2005), to shed new light on some perennial questions in
economics and the workings of future markets.
We use a unique dataset of daily price listings for precisely defined goods (at the level of unique product
codes) from a major online shopping platform to examine price setting practices in online markets in the United
States and the United Kingdom, two countries with a developed internet retail industry. This dataset covers
an exceptionally broad spectrum of consumer goods and sellers over a period of nearly two years. Similar to
the dataset in Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017), these data pertain to an online-shopping/price-comparison
website, a growing gateway for internet commerce. However, in contrast to Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017)
and others who scraped websites to collect their data, we have data directly provided by the platform, which
allows us to have the unprecedented quality of information characterizing online markets. Most importantly,
this dataset represents a stratified random sample of all goods and sellers on the platform. It also expands
product coverage tremendously, bringing it significantly closer to that in the consumer price index (CPI) and
giving us more room to compare online and offline prices.2 Finally, we have the number of clicks for each price
listing so that, in contrast to previous works, we can identify and study prices relevant to consumers.
This paper’s objective is to document an extensive set of the empirical properties of online prices (such
as the frequency and size of price changes, price synchronization across sellers and across goods, cross-store
price dispersion, and price responses to predictable changes in demand) and to compare our findings to results
reported for price data from conventional, brick-and-mortar stores. Similarities or differences in the properties
of prices across online and offline stores inform us about the nature and sources of sluggish price adjustment,
price discrimination, price dispersion, and many other important dimensions of market operation. Empirical
regularities documented in this paper are compared to the predictions of existing theories of price setting and,
thus, provide critical inputs for future theoretical work on the matter.
1“From ‘Zombie Malls’ to Bonobos: What America’s Retail Transformation Looks Like,” by J. Taggart and K. Granville. The New York
Times from 4/15/2017. Available online at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/business/from-zombie-malls-to-bonobos-americas-
retail-transformation.html.
2Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017) have longer time series (five years of online price data) and detailed descriptions of goods,
but the coverage of goods is limited to electronics, cameras, computers, and software. Note that because Gorodnichenko and Talavera
(2017) study cross-country price differentials, they focus on goods sold in multiple countries, which is a relatively small subset of goods
sold within a country. Also the platform used in this paper is larger than the platform in Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017) or any
other study. Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017)—and similar studies—report only a subset of statistics covered in the present paper.
Despite differences in the sample of goods, time periods, etc., the results in this paper are broadly similar to the results reported in
Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017).
1
Our main result is that, despite the power of the internet, online price setting is characterized by considerable
frictions. By many metrics, such as the size and synchronization of price changes, price dispersion, or sensitivity
to changes in economic conditions, the magnitude of these frictions should be similar to that in offline price
setting. However, we also find significant quantitative differences: the frequency of price changes is higher
online than offline. These results continue to hold when we compare the properties of online and offline prices
for narrowly defined product categories, which ensures that the composition of goods is similar across markets.
Jointly, these facts call for more research on the relative importance of menu, information, and search costs—
and, more generally, on the price-setting mechanism in online markets.
Specifically, we find that, despite small physical costs of price adjustment and reduced costs of collecting
and processing information, the duration of price spells in online markets is about 7 to 20 weeks, depending on
the treatment of sales. While this duration is considerably shorter than the duration typically reported for prices
in brick-and-mortar stores, online prices clearly do not adjust every instant. The median absolute size of a price
change in online markets, another measure of price stickiness, is 11 percent in the United States and 5 percent
in the United Kingdom, comparable to the size of price changes in offline stores. Sales in online markets are
about as frequent as sales in conventional stores (the share of goods on sale is approximately 1.5–2 percent per
week) but the average size of sales (10–12 percent or less in the United States and 6 percent or less in the United
Kingdom) is considerably smaller. We use rich, cross-sectional variation of market and good characteristics to
analyze how they are related to various pricing moments. We find, for example, that the degree of price rigidity
is smaller when markets are more competitive; that is, with a larger number of sellers, the frequency of price
changes increases and the median size decreases.
Although the costs of monitoring competitors’ prices and the costs of search for better prices are extraor-
dinarily low in online markets, we observe little synchronization of price changes across sellers, another key
statistic for non-neutrality of nominal shocks, a finding inconsistent with simultaneously low costs of monitoring
competitors’ prices and low costs of search for better prices. In particular, the synchronization rate is approxi-
mately equal to the frequency of price adjustment, suggesting that, by and large, online firms adjust their prices
independently of their competitors. Even over relatively long horizons, synchronization is low. We also fail to
find strong synchronization of price changes across goods within a seller; that is, a typical seller does not adjust
prices of its goods simultaneously. Finally, the synchronization rates of sales across goods for a given seller and
across sellers for a given good are similar to the frequency of sales.
In line with Warner and Barsky (1995), we find some evidence that prices in online stores respond to seasonal
changes in demand during Thanksgiving and Christmas, which is similar to the behavior of prices in regular
stores. We also show that there is large variation in demand, proxied by the number of clicks, over days of the
week or month. For example, there are 33 percent more clicks on Mondays than on Saturdays. Yet, online prices
appear to have little, if any, reaction to these predictable changes in demand, a finding that is inconsistent with
the predictions of Warner and Barsky (1995). These findings are striking because online stores are uniquely
positioned to use dynamic pricing (i.e., instantaneously incorporate information about changes in demand and
supply conditions).
We document ubiquitous price dispersion in online markets. For example, the standard deviation of log
prices for narrowly defined goods is 23.6 log points in the United States and 21.3 log points in the United
Kingdom. Even after removing seller fixed effects, which proxy for differences in terms of sales across stores,
the dispersion remains large. We also show that this high price dispersion cannot be rationalized by product
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life cycle. Specifically, a chunk of price dispersion appears at the time a product enters the market and price
dispersion grows (rather than falls) as the product becomes older. Price dispersion appears to be best char-
acterized as spatial rather than temporal. In other words, if a store charges a high price for a given good, it
does so consistently over time rather than alternating the price between low and high levels. In addition, price
dispersion can be related to the degree of price stickiness, intensity of sales, and returns to search.
To underscore the importance of clicks, we also calculate and present all moments weighted by clicks.
Such weighting tends to yield results consistent with a greater flexibility of online markets relative to conven-
tional markets: price rigidities decline, cross-sectional price dispersion falls, synchronization of price changes
increases. For example, using weights reduces the median duration of price spells from 7–12 to 5–7 weeks. Yet,
even when we use click-based weights, online markets are far from completely flexible.
Comparing prices in the United States and the United Kingdom offers additional insights.3 High penetration
of online trade in the two countries is largely due to availability of credit cards, a history of mail order and
catalogue shopping, and an early arrival of e-retailers, such as Amazon and eBay. Yet, there are important
differences between the two markets. For example, population density is eight times higher in the United
Kingdom than in the United States; thus, it is easier to organize fast and frequent deliveries in the United
Kingdom. We find that, despite the differences between the markets, price setting behavior is largely the same
in the two countries.
Although e-commerce has penetrated virtually all sectors of the economy and internet markets attracted
enormous attention of economists, analyses of online prices have been fragmented (see Ellison and Ellison
2005 for an early survey). The data used in these studies typically cover a limited number of consumer goods
in categories that feature early adoption of e-trade, such as books and CDs (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000),
span a short period of time, usually not exceeding a year (e.g., Lünnemann and Wintr 2011), or cover a specific
seller (e.g., Einav et al. 2015). In spite of increasing efforts to scrape more and more prices online to broaden
data coverage (Cavallo and Rigobon 2012, Cavallo 2013, 2015, Cavallo, Neiman, and Rigobon 2014, 2015),
we are aware of just a handful of studies that have information on the quantity margin for internet commerce
(e.g., Chu, Chintagunta, and Cebollada 2008, Baye et al. 2009, Soysal and Zentner 2014, Einav et al. 2015).
These studies rely on data from a particular seller and usually have limited coverage of goods. For example,
Baye et al. (2009) use data from the Yahoo! Kelkoo price comparison site to estimate the price elasticity of clicks
for 18 models of personal digital assistants sold by 19 different retailers between September 2003 and January
2004. Einav et al. (2015) have much broader product coverage; but as they focus on pricing that is specific to
eBay, it is hard to generalize their results to other stores. In contrast, the data used in this paper combine a
broad coverage of consumer goods with information on the number of clicks each price quote received at a daily
frequency for almost two years, a degree of data coverage that has not been within the reach of researchers in
the past. These unique properties of our data allow us to provide a comprehensive analysis of the properties of
online prices and to move beyond studying particular segments of this market or particular pricing moments.
For example, relative to our earlier work (Gorodnichenko and Talavera 2017), we cover price dispersion and
the properties of price adjustment (frequency, size, and synchronization of sales and of regular price changes)
in much greater detail, study predictors of online prices’ properties, and utilize clicks to have a better measure
of prices relevant to consumers for a wide spectrum of goods sold online. Thus, apart from presenting new
3In 2011 (median year in our sample), the value per head of business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce in the United Kingdom was
£1,083, making it the leading nation in terms of e-commerce. The growth of U.K. e-commerce has continued since then; in 2015, B2C
e-commerce reached £1,760 per head, with about 17 percent average annual growth in the 2010–2015 period; see Ofcom (2012, 2016).
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findings, this paper validates the results found in scraped data and multichannel sellers (i.e., sellers with online
and offline presence).
High-quality data for online prices are not only useful to estimate price rigidity and other properties of price
adjustment in online commerce but also allow comparing the behavior of prices online and offline. Empirical
studies on price stickiness usually document substantial price rigidity in brick-and-mortar retail stores (Klenow
and Kryvtsov 2008, Nakamura and Steinsson 2008, Klenow and Malin 2010). Theoretical models explain it with
exogenous time-dependent adjustment (Taylor 1980, Calvo 1983), menu costs (Sheshinski and Weiss 1977,
Mankiw 1985), search costs for consumers (Benabou 1988, 1992), the costs of updating information (Mankiw
and Reis 2002), or sticker costs4 (Diamond 1993). Why prices are sticky is important for real effects of nominal
shocks. For example, in the standard New Keynesian model with staggered price adjustment, nominal shocks
change relative prices and, hence, affect real variables (Woodford 2003).5 On the other hand, Head et al. (2012)
construct a model with price stickiness coming from search costs that delivers monetary neutrality. Overall, our
results suggest either that standard macroeconomic models of price rigidities, which emphasize menu costs and
search costs, are likely incomplete or that the magnitude of such costs is nontrivial in online markets, too. Since
the assumptions of popular mechanisms rationalizing imperfect price adjustment in traditional markets do not
fit well with e-commerce, more research is required to understand sources of price rigidities and dispersion.
For example, obfuscation emphasized in Ellison and Ellison (2009) and more intensive price experimentation
(Baye et al. 2007) may provide building blocks for future theories.6
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The data are described in the next section. Section 3 provides
estimates of the frequency, synchronization, and size of price changes and sales and compares them to pricing
moments in brick-and-mortar stores. Section 4 examines properties of price dispersion in online markets. This
section also explores how product entry and exit are related to observed price dispersion and other pricing
moments. Section 5 looks at the variation of prices over time, including conventional sales seasons and days of
the week and month. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
2 Data
We use proprietary data from a leading online-shopping/price-comparison platform7 on daily prices (net of
taxes and shipping costs) and clicks for more than 50,000 goods in 22 broadly-defined consumer categories in
the United States and the United Kingdom between May 2010 and February 2012. This dataset is a stratified
random sample of goods with at least one click per day obtained directly from the shopping platform; hence, it is
reliable and unlikely to have measurement error associated with scraping price observations from the internet.
The platform—and our dataset—cover virtually all product categories available on the internet. Broad product
coverage allows us to expand our understanding of how online markets work, which up until now has been
shaped largely by data on electronics, books, or apparel. Moreover, as a good is defined at the unique product
4That is, the inability of firms to change the price for inventories.
5In this model, price stickiness, in addition, leads to inflation persistence that is inherited from the underlying process for the output
gap or marginal cost. Modifications of this model that include shocks to the Euler equation, the indexation of price contracts, or
“rule-of-thumb” behavior give rise to intrinsic inflation persistence; see Fuhrer (2006, 2010).
6Other prominent theoretical models that provide possible explanations for price variation include Bakos (1997), Baye and Morgan
(2001), and Hong and Shum (2006). De los Santos, Hortaçsu, and Wildenbeest (2012) test consumer search models using online
browsing data.
7Examples of major shopping platforms and price comparison websites include Google Shopping, Nextag, and Pricegrabber. Ap-
pendix A describes how a typical shopping platform operates.
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level, similar to the Universal Product Code (UPC), this dataset is comparable to those used in the price-stickiness
literature (e.g., scanner data) and therefore allows us to compare price setting in online and brick-and-mortar
stores. However, we cannot match individual products online and offline, as UPC codes are masked within
narrow categories. For example, we know that product i is a particular cell phone, but we do not know its
brand or model. Having a large sample of sellers (more than 27,000), we can look at price setting through
the lens of competition between stores, analyze price dispersion across them, and examine the effect of market
characteristics on price adjustment. Despite the large number of sellers on the platform overall, typically there
are a limited number of sellers offering a particular product, thus making it easy to search for the best price.
Next, since the data are recorded at a daily frequency, we can study properties of prices at high frequencies.
Last and foremost, information on clicks can be used to focus on products that are relevant for online business.
Shopping/price-comparison platforms routinely use clicks as a proxy for transactions they generate for a seller’s
listing, and the service charge for using the platform is typically per-click. The rate of conversion from clicks
to purchases is about 2–3 percent (CPC Strategy 2014), and generally clicks are correlated with sales at the
aggregate level. Large stores (which sell more than 100 goods in our sample) receive the lion’s share of clicks.
Thus, using clicks as weights downplays the role of small sellers.
Note that because the sample is stratified by goods rather than stores, one should bear in mind that even
“small” stores in our data can sell many goods that were not sampled. For example, if the sample of goods is 1
percent of the population, a store selling 10,000 goods will be represented by only 100 randomly drawn goods.
Hence, a low number of goods per store should not be interpreted as suggesting that the stores in the sample
are small or that the sample is populated nearly exclusively by marketplace sellers typical for eBay and other
shopping platforms. While the sampling is not appropriate for measuring the absolute size of stores, it does
preserve the ranking of stores by size and market shares.
Unfortunately, we do not have information on actual sales, local taxes, shipping costs, detailed description
of goods, names of sellers, sellers’ costs/bids/budgets, and ratings of goods and sellers. Although the sample
period is long relative to previous studies of online markets, it is not long enough to accurately measure store
entry and exit, product turnover, or price behavior at longer horizons. Overall, we use the most comprehensive
dataset on online prices made available to researchers by a major online shopping platform.
Shopping Platform The shopping site that donated the data is a huge and growing price comparison plat-
form, which utilizes a fully commercialized product-ad system and has global operational coverage (including
countries such as Australia, Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Information available to consumers on the
platform includes a product description and image, the number of reviews, availability, and minimum price
across all participating stores. Consumers are also offered an option to browse other items in the same prod-
uct category. Information about sellers—name, rating, number of reviews, base price, total price with tax and
shipping cost, and a link to the seller’s website—is located below the description.8 The on-screen order of the
sellers is based on their quality rank (computed using reviews, click-through rate, etc.) and the bid price per
click. Consumers can sort the sellers by the average review score, base price, or total price. The platform also
8Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017) document that prices reported on a price comparison website (similar to the one used in this
paper) are highly correlated with the corresponding prices quoted by online stores (correlation is approximately 0.98). Likewise, Cavallo
(2017) reports a high consistency of offline and online prices for multichannel sellers with presence on the internet and in conventional
markets.
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provides information (but not the price) about nearby brick-and-mortar stores that offer the same product.
The seller specifies devices, language, and geographical location where the ad will appear, as well as a cost-
per-click bid and maximum daily spending on the ad. The seller may be temporarily suspended if daily spending
reaches the cap or the monthly bill is not paid on time. Remarkably, there is no explicit cost of an impression (a
listing display) or a price change. The seller pays for clicks only—although there is an implicit cost of having a
low click-through rate (number of clicks divided by number of impressions) associated with an increase in the
bid price required to reach the same on-screen position in the future. The online platform’s rules represent both
opportunities (no direct costs) and limitations (bad reviews or low click-through rate if unsuccessful) of price
experimentation on the platform and, overall, favor dynamic pricing. The seller’s information set consists of the
number of clicks for a given period, the number of impressions, the click-through rate, the average cost per click,
the number of conversions (specific actions, such as purchase on the seller’s website), the cost per conversion,
and the total cost of the ad—all are available through the seller’s ad-campaign account. The shopping platform
explicitly recommends that its sellers remove ads with a click-through rate smaller than 1 percent in order to
improve their quality rank (which can be monetized through a lower bid price for the same on-screen rank in
the future).
Our platform and similar platforms are used by consumers intensively as these platforms offer easy price
comparison and shopping experience. For example, a study by the European Commission (2013) reports that
74 percent of all shoppers in the European Union use internet comparison tools (price comparison websites are
the most popular ones: 73 percent of comparison tool users) to compare prices (69 percent of users) and find
the cheapest price (68 percent of users). Forty-eight percent of users check a price comparison website before
making an online purchase, and 35 percent of users report that the use of a comparison tool results in a purchase.
While there is no such study for the United States, scattered reports paint a similar picture. For example, Statista
(2015), a consultant firm, reports that 16 percent of U.S. consumers in 2014 used a price comparison website to
make their most recent purchase, thus making price comparison websites the most popular location for making
e-commerce purchases.
Coverage The sample covers 52,776 goods sold across 27,308 online stores in the United States and 52,767
goods across 8,757 stores in the United Kingdom in 2,055 narrowly defined product categories, which are aggre-
gated into 22 broad categories (e.g., costumes, vests, and dresses are subcategories in “Apparel and Accessories,”
while hard drives, video cards, motherboards, and processors are subcategories in “Electronics.” Importantly,
this dataset includes not only electronics, media, and apparel (categories studied before), but also product cat-
egories that have not been studied before, such as home and garden equipment, hardware, or vehicles. A list of
broad product categories, together with the corresponding number of sellers and goods, is provided in Table 1.
Some key results presented in this paper are available at the category level in the appendix.
Notation We use pist and qist to denote the price and number of clicks, respectively, for good i offered by seller
s at time t. Time is discrete, measured with days or weeks, and ends at T , the last day (week) observed. We
denote the set of all goods, all sellers, and all time periods asG = {1, . . . , N},S = {1, . . . , S}, andT = {1, . . . , T},
respectively, with N being the number of goods in the dataset and S the number of sellers. Subscripts i and
s indicate a subset (or its cardinality) that corresponds to a given good or seller. For instance, Ns ≤ N is the
number and Gs ⊆ G is the set of all goods sold by seller s, while Si ≤ S is the number and Si ⊆ S is the set
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Table 1. Data Coverage
United States United Kingdom
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Category Goods Sellers Goods Sellers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Media 14,370 3, 365 14,197 1, 136
Electronics 7,606 8,888 7,693 2,967
Home and Garden 5,150 6, 182 5,311 1, 931
Health and Beauty 4,425 3,676 4,425 1,362
Arts and Entertainment 2,873 2, 779 2,945 963
Hardware 2,831 3,200 2,770 1,042
Toys and Games 2,777 3, 350 3,179 1, 073
Apparel and Accessories 2,645 2,061 2,761 797
Sporting Goods 2,335 2, 781 2,392 950
Pet Supplies 1,106 1,241 1,145 295
Luggage and Bags 1,077 1, 549 1,037 679
Cameras and Optics 978 2,492 978 842
Office Supplies 849 1, 408 792 651
Vehicles and Parts 575 1,539 620 390
Software 506 1, 041 545 593
Furniture 334 1,253 338 408
Baby and Toddler 160 654 169 301
Business and Industrial 67 324 48 116
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 67 174 69 97
Mature 43 385 30 20
Services 26 119 50 112
Not Classified 1,976 3,465 1,273 1,039
Total 52,776 27,308 52,767 8,757
Source: Authors’ calculations based on proprietary data, provided on condition of nondisclosure.
of all sellers that offer good i. We denote averages with a bar and sums with the corresponding capital letter
(e.g., p¯is =
∑
t pist/T is the average price charged by seller s for good i over the entire sample period and
Q i t =
∑
s∈S qist is the total number of clicks that good i received across all sellers in week t).
Aggregation We use the number of clicks as a proxy for sales, at least partially bridging the gap between the
studies of online markets, which do not have such information, and brick-and-mortar stores, which use quantity
or sales weights to aggregate over products.9 We find that a relatively small number of products and sellers
obtain a disproportionately large number of clicks. To emphasize the difference between price-setting properties
for all products and sellers (available for scraping) and those that actually generate some activity on the user
side, we employ three different weighting schemes to aggregate the frequency, size, and synchronization of
price changes, as well as cross-sectional price dispersion, over goods and sellers. First, we compute the raw
average, with no weights used. Second, we use click weights to aggregate across sellers of the same product but
then compute the raw average over products. We refer to this scheme as within-good weighting. Third, we use
clicks to aggregate across both sellers and products (referred to as between-good weighting). More specifically,
let fis be, for example, the frequency of price changes for good i offered by seller s, and Q is the total number of
9Details on data aggregation from daily to a weekly frequency is relegated to Appendix B.
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clicks. The three aggregate measures (denoted by f¯ , f¯ w, and f¯ b, respectively) are computed as follows:
f¯ =
∑
i
1
N
∑
s
fis
1
S
,
f¯ w =
∑
i
1
N
∑
s
fis · Q is∑
s Q is︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-good
weights
, (1)
f¯ b =
∑
i
∑
s Q is∑
i
∑
s Q is︸ ︷︷ ︸ ·
between-good
weights
∑
s
fis · Q is∑
s Q is︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-good
weights
.
Empirically, the difference between f¯ and f¯ w is often much smaller than the difference between either
of them and f¯ b, as many products have only one seller. However, the within-good weighting appears more
important if we look only at products with a sufficiently large number of sellers. We use f¯ b as our baseline
click-weighted measure, since it is the closest among the three to the corresponding brick-and-mortar measure
and incorporates information on the relative importance of goods in the consumption basket of online shoppers.
We relegate all relevant results obtained using within-good weights f¯ w to Appendix C.
Price Distribution and Clicks Table 2 reports percentiles of the distribution over goods of the average price
for a good, p¯i , together with the mean and the standard deviation of the average log price, log pi . The median
good in the sample costs around $25 in the United States and £19 in the United Kingdom. About a quarter of
goods cost $11 or less; products that cost $100 or more represent around 20 percent of the sample. Goods that
obtain more clicks tend to be more expensive: the median price computed using the between-good weights is
$61 and £48 in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively.
To illustrate the importance of clicks for measuring prices effectively paid by consumers, for each good we
compute the average (over time) log deviation of the price of seller s, pist , from the median price across sellers,epi t :
ρ¯is =
1
T
∑
t
log (pist/epi t) . (2)
Panels A and B of Figure 1 plot the density of deviations without weights and with the between-good weights
based on the number of clicks, Q i t . Applying the weights shifts the distribution to the left by approximately 10
percent; that is, sellers with a price substantially below the median product price receive a larger number of
clicks.
To show the relationship between prices and clicks, Panels C and D of Figure 1 plot clicks against prices,
measured as log-deviation from the median seller for a good on a given date. To enhance visibility, we show
the scatterplot for bins based on the percentiles of the price measure, and then pass a Lowess smoother to
allow for nonlinearities in the clicks-price relationship. The figure paints a clear picture that sellers with a price
significantly below the median obtain more clicks. The curve is flatter in the region of a positive price deviation,
supporting the notion that the clicks are especially sensitive to prices when prices are in the lower end of the
price distribution.
8
Table 2. Distribution of Prices, local currency
Mean Log Price Mean Price
Standard 5th Per- 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number
Mean Deviation centile centile Median centile centile of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
No weights 3.37 1.53 4 11 25 71 474
52,776
Click weighted 4.15 1.51 7 22 61 192 852
Panel B: United Kingdom
No weights 3.13 1.56 3 8 19 57 381
52,767
Click weighted 3.82 1.44 5 17 48 134 473
Notes: Columns (1)–(2) show moments of the distribution of the average (for a good) log price, log pi , columns (3)–(7) of the average price, p¯i , and
column (8) the total number of goods, N .
Figure 1. Prices and Clicks
Panel A: United States, price distribution
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Panel C: United States, clicks vs. price
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Panel D: United Kingdom, clicks vs. price
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Notes: In the top two panels, the red dashed line shows the distribution of the log price deviation from the median across sellers, and the black solid line
shows the between-good click-weighted distribution of that deviation. In the bottom two panels, the dots represent data points averaged within bins
based on percentiles of the log-deviation of price. The Lowess smoothing is calculated with a 0.05 bandwidth.
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3 Price Stickiness
Price-adjustment frictions should be smaller for online stores than for brick-and-mortar stores. For example,
changing the price does not require printing a new price tag and is therefore less costly. Price adjustment for
online markets may also employ algorithmic approaches (“dynamic pricing”) to avoid costs associated with col-
lecting and processing information as well as costs related to making collective decisions (e.g., “meeting” costs).
In a similar spirit, consumers can compare prices across retailers without leaving their desks (smaller search
costs). As a result, we should observe a slightly higher frequency and smaller size of price changes in online mar-
kets. At the same time, lower costs of monitoring competitors’ prices should lead to a higher synchronization of
price changes across sellers and across goods, thus diminishing nominal non-neutrality. This section challenges
these conjectures by showing that online markets are not that different from their conventional counterparts
after all.
3.1 Regular and Posted Prices
Previous work (see Klenow and Malin 2010 for an overview) emphasizes the importance of temporary price
cuts (“sale prices”) for measuring the degree of price rigidities. However, Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo
(2011) point out that sale prices carry little weight at the aggregate level because they likely represent a reaction
to idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, we make a distinction between posted prices (i.e., prices we observe in the data)
and regular prices (i.e., prices that exclude sales).
In contrast to scanner data, our dataset does not have sales flags and therefore we use filters as in Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008), Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011), and Kehoe and Midrigan (2015) to identify
temporary price changes.10 We consider a price change to be temporary if the price returns to its original level
within one or two weeks. As the dataset contains missing values, we identify sales with and without imputation,
using a standard procedure in the literature. Consider the following price series: {$2, n.a., $2, n.a., $1, $2},
where “n.a.” denotes missing values. In the “no imputation” case, we assume that “n.a.” breaks a price series
so that we have only one series of consecutive observations, {$1, $2}. In this case, there is one “regular” price
change from $1 to $2 because $1 is preceded by “n.a.” and not by $2. In the “imputation” case, we replace “n.a.”
with an actual price if the prices before and after “n.a.” are equal to each other. We also identify an episode as
a sale if the first observable price before “n.a.” and the last observable price after “n.a.” are the same. That is,
in our example, we replace the first “n.a.” with a $2 price and we drop the second “n.a.” from the identification
of sales. The imputed series of regular prices thus becomes {$2, $2, $2, n.a., n.a. $2}; the imputed series of
sale flags is {0, n.a., 0, n.a., 1, 0}; and the imputed series of regular price changes is {n.a., 0, 0, n.a., n.a., 0},
where the first “n.a.” is due to spell truncation.11 We report statistics for the two assumptions separately and
present additional results for alternative imputation procedures in Appendix Table G2. We find that reasonable
10We use both ∨- and ∧-shaped filters to account not only for temporary price cuts but also for temporary price increases (e.g., due
to stockout).
11In this example, our “imputation” filter applies to one missing value between two observed prices. In practice, our filters are applied
up to five missing values between any two observed prices. This procedure is valid because we compute the frequency of price changes
and then use it to infer the implied duration of price spells, instead of computing duration directly. Hence, we make no additional
assumptions on unobserved prices. We do not use imputation as our baseline frequency statistic or for any other measure reported in
this paper. Appendix Table G1 shows that imputing an arbitrarily large number of missing values between two observed prices has little
effect on the frequency of price changes. To assess the extent of imputation, Appendix Figure G1 reports the distribution over goods of
the share of imputed price changes. On average, 27.3 percent of price changes in the U.S. sample are imputed.
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Table 3. Frequency and Size of Sales
One-Week Filter Two-Week Filter
Mean Standard Med. Med. Mean Standard Med. Med. Number
Freq. Deviation Freq. Size Freq. Deviation Freq. Size of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: United States
No Imputation
No weights 1.3 3.1 0.0 10.5 1.9 3.9 0.0 10.5 10, 567
Click weighted 1.7 1.9 1.4 4.4 2.6 2.5 2.2 4.8 10, 567
With Imputation
No weights 1.6 3.5 0.0 11.9 2.2 4.2 0.0 11.9 21, 452
Click weighted 1.9 1.9 1.6 4.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 5.3 21, 452
Offline Stores 1.9 n.a. n.a. 29.5
Panel B: United Kingdom
No Imputation
No weights 0.9 2.9 0.0 5.7 1.3 3.7 0.0 5.7 4, 464
Click weighted 1.3 1.7 1.0 2.5 1.8 2.3 1.4 2.9 4, 464
With Imputation
No weights 1.1 3.3 0.0 6.2 1.6 4.0 0.0 5.9 10, 754
Click weighted 1.4 1.8 1.0 2.5 2.0 2.4 1.5 3.2 10, 754
Offline Stores 0.3 n.a. n.a. 7.0
Notes: Column (1) reports the average weekly frequency of sales across goods (percent), column (2) the standard deviation of the frequency across
goods, column (3) the frequency for the median good, and column (4) the absolute size of sales for the median good measured by the log difference
between the sale and regular price (multiplied by 100). In all the four columns, we identify sales using the one-week, two-side sale filter (see the text).
Columns (5)–(8) report the same statistics for the two-week sale filter. Column (9) reports the number of goods. The statistics for offline stores are from
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for the U.S. and Kryvtsov and Vincent (2014) for the U.K.; the mean frequency is converted to the weekly rate.
modifications to our imputation procedure do not alter our conclusions.
Table 3 reports the frequency and size of sales. In the United States, the mean weekly frequency of sales
(columns 1 and 5), without weights, is in the range of 1.3–2.2 percent, depending on the filter. This weekly
frequency is comparable to the frequency of sales reported for prices in regular stores. There is substantial
heterogeneity in the frequency across products: we do not find sales in more than a half of the products (see
column 3). When we focus on goods that receive more clicks (use between-good weights), sales occur more
often: the mean frequency is 1.7–2.7 percent depending on a computation technique. The median size of
sales is 10.5–11.9 percent with equal weights and 4.4–5.3 percent with between-good weights. These sizes are
smaller than the size of sales in regular stores (about 20–30 percent). Using our “imputation” procedure for
missing values tends to generate a higher frequency and size of sales. The magnitudes are similar for the United
Kingdom, although there is some variation across countries for disaggregate categories of goods, which likely
reflects idiosyncratic factors affecting specific markets in the two countries.
We also report the degree of synchronization of sales (across sellers for a given good or across goods within a
given seller), which can be informative about the nature of sales.12 For example, sales could be strategic substi-
tutes (low synchronization) or complements (high synchronization), they could be determined by seller-specific
factors (low synchronization) or aggregate shocks (high synchronization).13 We find (Appendix Table G3) that
the synchronization of sales across sellers is below 2 percent in each country. The synchronization of sales across
12We define the sale synchronization rate as the mean share of sellers that put a particular product on sale when another seller of the
same good has a sale. In particular, if B is the number of sellers of good i and A of them have sales, the synchronization rate is computed
as (A− 1)/(B − 1); that is, the statistic is calculated only conditional on having at least one sale. See Section 3.4 for more details.
13Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) propose a model of sales that are strategic substitutes. Alternatively, Anderson et al. (2013) present
evidence that sales are largely determined by seller-specific factors and best described as being on “autopilot” (not related to aggregate
variables and not synchronized).
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goods within a seller is less than 3 percent in the United States and 4 percent in the United Kingdom. Because
the degree of synchronization is similar to the frequency of sales, we conclude that the synchronization of sales
is low.
3.2 Frequency and Size of Price Changes
Frequency We compute the frequency of price adjustment per quote line as the number of nonzero price
changes divided by the number of observed price changes.14 This measure is then aggregated to the good
level. Based on the frequency of price adjustment, we also compute the implied duration of price spells under
the assumption of constant hazards. Specifically, let ϕist = I{qis,t > 0}I{qis,t−1 > 0} be the indicator function
whether a price change (either zero or not) is observed, Πis =
∑
t ϕist the number of observed price changes
per quote line, and χist = I{|∆log pist | > 0.001} the indicator function for a nonzero price change. Then, the
frequency of price adjustment per quote line is the number of nonzero price changes divided by the number of
observed price changes,
fis =
∑
t χist
Πis
. (3)
We aggregate this measure to the good level by taking the raw, f¯i , and click-weighted, f¯
w
i , average across quote
lines with at least five observations for a price change:
f¯i =
1∑
s∈Si I{Πis > 4}
∑
s∈Si
fisI {Πis > 4} , (4)
f¯ wi =
∑
s fisI {Πis > 4}Qϕis∑
s I{Πis > 4}Qϕis
, (5)
where Qϕis =
∑
t qistϕist . The former measure is referred to as “no weights” and the latter as “within-good
weights.” The “between-good” measure reports the distribution across goods of f¯ wi with Wi = Q
Π
i /
∑
i∈G QΠi
used as weights, where QΠi =
∑
s∈Si I{Πis > 4}Qϕis. The implied duration of price spells is then computed as
d¯i = − 1
ln
 
1− f¯i
 . (6)
The first two rows in each panel of Table 4 show the estimated frequency of price changes and the corre-
sponding implied duration. In the United States, the median implied duration of price spells varies from 7 to
12 weeks when no weights are applied and from 5 to 6 weeks when we use weights across sellers and goods.
When we apply the one-week sale filter, the duration of price spells increases by 20–65 percent. The magnitudes
are similar for the United Kingdom. We also find that the frequency of price increases is approximately equal
to the frequency of price decreases (Appendix Table G4). Despite significant heterogeneity in the frequency of
price changes across products (Appendix D), our aggregate statistics are not driven by any particular categories
(Appendix E).
Price spells for online stores appear significantly shorter than for brick-and-mortar stores (by up to a half
14This measure is analogous to the one used by Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), and Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008). In line with Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011), price changes smaller than 0.1 percent are not counted as price
changes. We exclude quote lines with fewer than five observations. Following Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), we compute the
frequency of price changes and then infer the implied duration of spells, to avoid bias due to spell truncation.
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Table 4. Frequency and Size of Price Changes
No Imputation With Imputation
No Click No Click Offline
Weights Weighted Weights Weighted Stores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 14.0 19.3 8.2 15.7 4.7
Implied duration, weeks 6.6 4.7 11.6 5.8 20.8
Median absolute size, log points 11.0 11.2 10.7
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 8.8 14.5 7.0 12.9 2.1
Implied duration, weeks 10.9 6.4 13.9 7.3 47.1
Median absolute size, log points 10.9 10.9 8.5
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 12.8 20.0 7.7 16.3 4.6
Implied duration, weeks 7.3 4.5 12.5 5.6 21.2
Median absolute size, log points 5.1 8.5 11.1
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 7.7 15.8 6.7 14.3 3.2
Implied duration, weeks 12.5 5.8 14.5 6.5 30.7
Median absolute size, log points 5.0 7.6 8.7
Notes: Column (1) reports the frequency and size of price changes when missing values are dropped and no weights are applied.
Column (2) reports click-weighted results using our default weighting method. Columns (3)–(4) report the analogous statistics
when missing values are imputed (if the next available observation is within four weeks and there is no price change). Column
(5) shows the corresponding statistics from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for the U.S. and Kryvtsov and Vincent (2014) for the
U.K., converted to a weekly frequency. Regular prices are identified using a one-week filter for sales.
for posted prices and by two-thirds for regular prices). However, with spells of up to four months, online prices
are far from being completely flexible, pointing toward price-adjustment frictions other than the conventional
nominal costs of price change. At the same time, goods that receive a large number of clicks have more flexi-
ble prices—with the average duration of only 5–7 weeks for regular and posted prices. These magnitudes are
similar to the results reported in earlier papers (Lünnemann and Wintr 2011, Boivin, Clark, and Vincent 2012,
Gorodnichenko and Talavera 2017) for specific segments of e-commerce.15 We find the same pattern when we
compare the properties of online and offline prices within narrowly defined product categories (see Appendix F).
Therefore, our findings are not driven by differences in the composition of goods in e-commerce and conven-
tional retailers.16 Because large online stores receive a large share of clicks (Appendix Figure G2), our results
with between-good weights (our baseline) are similar to the results we obtain for the sample restricted to large
stores (Table G5). However, when we focus on very large stores (100+ products), we find smaller shares of
stores that do not change their prices at all (Figure G3). We also find that the hazard of price adjustment is
decreasing in the duration of price spells (Figure G4).
Size Using our notation in the previous section, we can write the average absolute size of price changes for
good i as follows: ∆log pi= 1∑
s∈Si
∑
t χist
∑
s∈Si
∑
t
|∆log pist | ·χ ist . (7)
15The frequency of price adjustment in our data is higher than the frequency of price adjustment for multichannel stores (Cavallo
2017). The adjustment of online prices for this type of stores is likely “slowed down” by the stickiness of offline prices and the apparent
desire of these stores to maintain consistency of online and offline prices.
16Ideally, one would like to match specific goods sold online to exactly the same goods sold offline, thereby completely eliminating
potential differences in the composition. Unfortunately, we cannot do this because we do not have names or detailed descriptions of the
goods in our dataset, and available offline-price datasets with broad coverage (e.g., BLS micro-level price data) do not have detailed
descriptions of goods.
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Next, let Qχi =
∑
s∈Si
∑
t qistχist be the total number of clicks when a nonzero price change occurs. The within-
good weighted average of this measure can be written as∆log piw = ∑
s∈Si
∑
t
qistχist
Qχi︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-good
weights
|∆log pist | . (8)
Finally, the between-good weighted results are based on the weighted distribution of |∆log pi|w with weights
Wi = Q
χ
i /
∑
i∈G Q
χ
i , implemented in a similar fashion as for the frequency of price adjustment.
The last row of each panel in Table 4 reports the absolute size of price change. In the United States, online
sellers change their prices on average by 11 percent, which is somewhat larger than the estimates reported in
earlier studies. This magnitude is remarkably stable and close to that for brick-and-mortar stores. Again, we
find similar results when we compare the size of price changes for online and offline prices for goods within
narrowly defined product categories. The fact that online sellers adjust their prices more often than their offline
counterparts, but by roughly the same amount, indicates the presence of implementation costs of price change.
Incidentally, regular and temporary changes are approximately of the same size. In the United Kingdom, the size
of price change is smaller (approximately 5 percent), but it approaches the U.S. statistics when between-good
weights are applied (8.5 percent). Price decreases are slightly smaller than price increases (Appendix Table G6).
We also find that very large stores (100+ products) are less likely than small stores to have large price changes
(Appendix Figure G5).
3.3 Do Prices Change Mostly during Product Replacement?
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) emphasize that product replacement is potentially an important margin of
price adjustment and that focusing on goods with short product lives and no price changes can overstate the
degree of price rigidity (“product replacement bias”). In the context of online prices, Cavallo, Neiman, and
Rigobon (2014, henceforth, CNR) scraped price data from selected online retailers (Apple, IKEA, H&M, and
Zara) and documented three facts related to the product replacement bias: (1) most products do not change
their prices throughout the lifetime (77 percent in the U.S. sample); (2) the median duration of product life is
short (15 weeks); and (3) products that live longer are more likely to have at least one price change (a product
observed for more than two years is 39 percentage points more likely than an average product to have at least
one price change).
To assess the importance of product replacement for measurement of price rigidities in online markets, we
first compute the share of products with a constant price over their lives and compare these products to products
with at least one price change.17 In the United States, 11.9 percent of goods have a constant price within their
life span (column 1 of Table 5)—this is significantly lower than 77 percent in CNR. Moreover, goods with no
price change account for only 1 percent of total clicks. When we look at products in apparel that are offered by
one seller only (hence, a sample of goods that is more similar to those in H&M or Zara), the share of goods with
no price changes rises to 31 percent and the corresponding share of clicks to 26 percent (column 3). When we
17Our data do not provide direct information about when a good is introduced or discontinued. We approximate entry and exit of
goods with the dates when goods appear for the first and last time. We also drop products that enter or exit within the first or last
five weeks of our data to avoid truncation bias in product-life duration. We find similar results when we exclude goods with truncated
entry/exit (Appendix Table G7).
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Table 5. Price Adjustment and Product Replacement
All Products Apparel, One Seller —excl. Jewelry and Watches
Constant Price Constant Price Constant Price
Price Changes Price Changes Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Share of goods, percent 11.9 88.1 31.0 69.0 42.4 57.6
Share of clicks, percent 1.3 98.7 25.7 74.3 30.8 69.2
Average number of clicks per quote 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.7
Average number of price quotes 9.1 12.2 8.6 10.7 7.7 10.6
Average number of sellers 1.3 5.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Duration of product life, weeks 36.2 57.2 27.9 37.4 22.3 30.3
nontruncated observations only 32.2 43.3 24.7 34.0 20.5 27.1
Total number of goods 3,119 23,060 192 428 78 106
Panel B: United Kingdom
Share of goods, percent 17.0 83.0 29.5 70.5 34.1 65.9
Share of clicks, percent 3.3 96.7 25.5 74.5 34.3 65.7
Average number of clicks per quote 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.4
Average number of price quotes 8.7 10.8 8.0 9.6 8.3 8.9
Average number of sellers 1.2 3.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Duration of product life, weeks 28.5 45.3 24.5 34.4 19.0 27.4
nontruncated observations only 26.0 35.7 21.1 29.9 15.8 23.8
Total number of goods 2,467 12,005 142 340 61 118
Notes: The table compares the sample of goods with a constant price (odd-numbered columns) and goods with at least one price change (even-numbered
columns). Columns (1) and (2) are for the entire sample, columns (3) and (4) for products in “apparel and accessories” that have only one seller (like
those in H&M and Zara), and columns (5) and (6), in addition, exclude jewelry and watches. Only quote lines with five or more price quotes are con-
sidered. To compare, the share of products with any price changes in Cavallo, Neiman, and Rigobon (2014) is 23 percent for the entire U.S. sample (21
percent for H&M and 3 percent for Zara).
further remove jewelry and watches, which represent a large share of “apparel and accessories” in our data but
are not key for H&M and Zara, the magnitudes further increase to 42 and 31 percent, respectively (column 5).
We observe a similar pattern in the United Kingdom. Hence, the prevalence of goods with no price changes in
the CNR data appears to be determined by their sample of goods and sellers.
In the next step, we compare (Table 5) goods with and without price changes along four dimensions: (1)
the average number of clicks for a price quote; (2) the observed duration of product life; (3) the number of
price quotes with a click; and (4) the number of sellers. While these two groups of goods are similar in terms
of (1), we see considerable differences in all other dimensions. In the United States, goods with at least one
price change, on average, span over 57 weeks, have 12 price quotes, and 5 sellers as opposed to 36 weeks,
9 quotes, and 1 seller for goods with no price changes. The U.K. data look remarkably similar in this regard.
Hence, goods with no price changes have a shorter life (similar to the results in CNR) and are more likely to
be sold by just one retailer (hence, the difference between this paper and CNR). We find that the frequency of
price adjustment is similar across goods with different product lives (Appendix Table G8).
3.4 Synchronization
Measurement To measure the extent to which stores change prices simultaneously, we define the synchro-
nization of price changes across sellers as the mean share of sellers that change the price for a particular good
when another seller of the same good changes its price. In other words, if A is the number of sellers of good i
that change their prices at time t and B is the number of all sellers of good i at t, the synchronization rate is
(A− 1)/(B − 1), provided A > 0 and B > 1. Note that this statistic is calculated for a given good and period
conditional on having at least one price change. The synchronization rate ranges between zero (no synchroniza-
tion) and one (perfect synchronization). More formally, the synchronization rate, z¯i , for good i is computed as
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the time average of nonmissing values of
zi t =
∑
s∈Si t χist
− 1
Si t − 1 , (9)
where Si t = #Si t ≤ S is the number of sellers and χist = I{| log pist | > 0.001} is the indicator function for a
price change.
This measure of synchronization assigns equal weights to all sellers. To the extent that online markets
have lots of inactive fringe sellers, this measure can understate the degree of synchronization among main
players. To address this potential problem, we consider the following within-good, click-weighted measure of
the synchronization of price changes:
zwi t =
∑
s∈Si t qistχist
− q¯χi t∑
s∈Si t qist
− q¯χi t =
∑
s∈Si t χist
− 1
Si t
q¯i t
q¯χi t
− 1 , (10)
where q¯χi t is the average number of clicks over sellers that change the price and q¯i t is the average number of
clicks over all sellers for the same good and time.18 This synchronization rate uses the number of stores that
changed their price (minus one) in the numerator, exactly as for zi t , and the “effective” (as opposed to actual for
zi t) number of stores (minus one) in the denominator—the number of stores that would generate the same total
clicks if sellers that did not change the price on average received the same number of clicks as stores that did,
Si t · (q¯i t/q¯χi t). The within-good, click-weighted measure of synchronization, z¯wi , is the weighted time average
of zwi t , where the weights are Q i t/
∑
t Q i t and Q i t is the number of clicks for periods with well-defined z
w
i t . The
between-good, weighted average is then calculated as the weighted mean of z¯wi with weights Wi =
∑
t Q i t/∑
t
∑
i∈G Q i t . To calculate the synchronization rate across goods, we just swap subscripts for sellers and goods
in the above formulas.
Sellers may fail to synchronize price changes at a weekly frequency, but may be able to do so at lower
frequencies. Measuring synchronization over horizons longer than one week, however, is more complex: for
an h-week period, a given week can take any of the h positions in the period depending on when the period
starts.19 To resolve this ambiguity about start dates, we compute the upper bound of synchronization at horizon
h. Specifically, we split our sample into nonoverlapping periods of duration h and compute the synchronization
rate using the method we described above. We then shift the start date for each period by one week and repeat
the exercise. We do this h times and report the maximum synchronization rate across the different starting
dates.20
To put the measured synchronization rates into perspective, we report the synchronization rates that one
would observe if price adjustment followed Calvo (1983). In particular, let f¯ b be the median frequency of price
adjustment computed with between-good click weights (our benchmark), then the Calvo synchronization rate
at horizon h is 1− (1− f¯ b)h+1. This is a useful benchmark: there is no synchronization of price changes under
Calvo pricing, yet the measured synchronization rate is not zero because some price changes just coincide in
18That is, q¯χi t =
∑
s∈Si t qistχ ist/
∑
s∈Si t χist and q¯i t =
∑
s∈Si t qist/Si t .
19For example, consider synchronization over three weeks. Week t could be a part of three three-week periods that start at different
times: {t − 2, t − 1, t}, {t − 1, t, t + 1}, and {t, t + 1, t + 2}.
20We are grateful to Nicolas Vincent for pointing out that the measure based on overlapping windows would suffer from downward
bias.
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time. Because the Calvo assumption of a fixed hazard of price adjustment may be at odds with the data, we also
construct cumulative synchronization rates using empirical hazard functions and maintaining the assumption
of price adjustment independence across goods/sellers.
Synchronization across Sellers Bhaskar (2002), among others, emphasizes that nominal shocks should have
limited real effects if price changes are synchronized. In a limiting case, if price adjustment is perfectly syn-
chronized, the real effects of nominal shocks can last at most as long as the duration of price spells. Our
evidence suggests that the synchronization of price changes across sellers is remarkably low in both countries
(see columns 1–4 of Table 6). The average synchronization rate for posted prices (no weights) is about 10 per-
cent in the United States and 15 percent in the United Kingdom; more than a half of products in each country
have zero synchronization. The average rate is even smaller for regular prices (no weights): 8 percent and 12
percent in each country, respectively; hence, sales are more synchronized than regular price changes. Although
the synchronization rate is higher when aggregated using between-good weights—in the United States the me-
dian is 15 percent for posted prices and 13 percent for regular prices, and in the United Kingdom the values are
18 percent and 14 percent, respectively—it is still significantly lower than one could have expected. Alternative
measures of synchronization yield the same conclusion.21
Can this result be explained by the timing of price responses? For example, although the cost of monitoring
competitors’ prices in online markets is low, online sellers might still need some time to collect and analyze
information, as well as to make decisions about price changes. Yet, even at a three-month horizon, no more
than 60 percent of competitors adjust their prices (see column 4 of Table 6). Moreover, the curve representing
the synchronization rate over time (Panels A and C of Figure 2) lies below the curve for Calvo pricing and is
significantly flatter than it. The synchronization rates across time also lie below the corresponding cumulative
hazard function, which accounts for empirical heterogeneity in the probability of price change across spells
of different duration.22 This pattern suggests significant heterogeneity in price responses across sellers: some
sellers are relatively attentive and change their prices often, while other sellers (“zombie” sellers) almost never
react to changes in competitors’ prices. This result also holds for regular prices (Appendix Figure G6). In
short, price changes in online markets are rather staggered over time, which corresponds to potentially tangible
monetary non-neutrality.
Synchronization across Goods If firms do not adjust prices simultaneously with their competitors, do they
at least synchronize price changes across goods they sell? Such cross-good synchronization is at the heart of
popular theories of multiproduct firms (Midrigan 2011, Alvarez and Lippi 2014), which claim that multiproduct
firms with a fixed cost of changing all their prices can explain the prevalence of small price changes in the data,
a fact that conventional menu-cost models (Golosov and Lucas 2007) cannot explain. We find little support
for this theory in the online-market data. Price synchronization across goods within a seller is low and similar
to the synchronization rates across sellers for a given good (columns 5–8 of Table 6). In the United States,
the average synchronization rate is 17 percent, without weights, and 23 percent when between-seller weights
are applied (15 percent and 18 percent for regular prices). In the United Kingdom, the synchronization rates
21In Appendix Table G9, we report the coefficient of variation of the fraction of price changes over time. If price setting is Calvo, this
alternative measure equals zero, regardless of the Calvo rate. However, unlike our baseline measure, it is not bounded between 0 and
1, and cannot be used to measure the time required by sellers to synchronize prices.
22The fact that the cumulative hazard function lies above the Calvo curve means that the probability of price change falls with the
duration of price spells, as captured by the decreasing hazard rates depicted in Appendix Figure G4.
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Table 6. Synchronization Rate, percent
Synchronization across Sellers Synchronization across Goods
At At
Standard Three-Month Standard Three-Month
Mean Deviation Median Horizon Mean Deviation Median Horizon
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
No weights 10.2 18.6 0.0 41.3 17.2 27.4 1.6 45.7
Click weighted 15.7 10.0 15.1 55.2 22.5 11.6 24.9 66.7
Regular Price
No weights 7.8 16.4 0.0 40.6 14.7 25.7 0.0 46.1
Click weighted 12.8 8.6 12.6 52.8 18.3 10.3 20.3 64.3
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
No weights 14.7 24.8 0.0 50.4 19.7 26.5 8.2 55.2
Click weighted 17.9 11.1 17.9 62.6 26.1 16.7 26.0 72.0
Regular Price
No weights 12.1 22.9 0.0 50.5 16.6 24.7 5.0 54.9
Click weighted 15.6 10.5 14.3 62.9 22.4 15.3 21.2 69.6
Notes: Columns (1)–(3) report the mean, standard deviation, and median of the weekly synchronization for a good across sellers. Column (4) reports the
upper bound of synchronization at a three-month horizon. Columns (5)–(8) report the same measures for the weekly synchronization for a seller across
goods. Regular prices are identified based on a one-week, two-side filter.
Figure 2. Synchronization Rate for Posted Prices by Time Horizon
Panel A: United States, for good over sellers
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Panel B: United States, for seller over goods
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Panel C: United Kingdom, for good over sellers
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Panel D: United Kingdom, for seller over goods
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Notes: Panels A and C report the upper bound synchronization across sellers at a week-h horizon, while Panels B and D report synchronization across
goods. The red dashed line shows the raw average and the black solid line shows the click-weighted measure. The blue “dash-dot” line shows the
synchronization rate under the assumption of a fixed probability of price adjustment, as in Calvo (1983), based on the between-good click-weighted
median frequency. The magenta “long dash–dot” line shows the cumulative hazard rate starting from the empirical Calvo rate at h = 0. Empirical hazard
rates are reported in Appendix Figure G4.
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are slightly higher: 20 percent (unweighted) and 26 percent (weighted) for posted prices (17 percent and 22
percent, respectively, for regular prices). The unweighted median rates are all below 10 percent (and very close
to zero in the U.S. data). At a three-month horizon (see column 8 of Table 6 and Panels B and D of Figure 2),
the share of goods with price changes is still below 60 percent (75 percent with between-seller weights)—not
much higher than a corresponding measure of cross-seller price synchronization.23
Synchronization of Price Increases and Decreases In the textbook theory of oligopolistic markets, sellers
that face a kinked demand curve are more likely to follow a decrease in competitors’ prices (to protect their
market share) than an increase. Instead, in models of market segmentation into loyal customers and bargain
hunters (Guimaraes and Sheedy 2011), substantial temporary price decreases (sales) are not synchronized, as
firms prefer to avoid direct competition for bargain hunters. We do not, however, find much evidence for either
claim in the online-market data: (i) the synchronization rates for price increases and decreases are of the same
order of magnitude; and (ii) the difference between the two is largely driven by underlying differences in the
frequency of price adjustment (i.e., whenever price increases are more frequent than decreases, they are also
more likely to be synchronized). These conclusions also hold for regular prices (see Appendix Tables G10 and
G11).
3.5 Predictors of Price Stickiness
Market and good characteristics could be related to the heterogeneity of price stickiness across products. We
focus on five statistics that summarize market competition, structure, and consumer search intensity: (1) the
number of sellers that offer a given product; (2) market concentration measured by the click-based Herfindahl
index; (3) market size approximated by clicks; (4) the median product price; and (5) the share of prices that
end at 95 to 99 cents (“price points”).24 The first two statistics measure the degree of competition across sellers.
The third statistic can be related to returns to correct, profit-maximizing pricing: a larger market means larger
profits from charging the right prices. The fourth statistic can be a proxy for the intensity of consumer search:
the absolute return to search is higher for more expensive products.25 Finally, the last statistic measures the
degree of inattention to exact prices when consumers face a choice between multiple sellers (Knotek II 2011).
Because price points are separated, price adjustment for goods with strong prevalence can become less frequent.
Because the time-dimension of our data is relatively short, we measure pricing moments—the frequency,
size, and cross-seller synchronization of price changes—and potential predictors at the good level (i.e., we ex-
ploit cross-sectional variation in goods’ characteristics). For example, the good-level frequency of price changes
is calculated as follows. For each store selling a given good, we calculate the price-line frequency of price
changes. Then we aggregate it to the good level using the mean frequency (with and without click weighting)
23Many online stores sell goods in multiple categories. The measured synchronization across goods may be weak because stores can
synchronize price changes within categories but not across categories. To assess the quantitative importance of this explanation, we
calculate the synchronization rate across goods within a category for each seller and then aggregate the category-level rates to the store
level. Irrespective of whether we use a narrow or broad definition of categories, we continue to find low synchronization rates, which
are similar to our benchmark measure.
24All variables are in logs except for the share of price points and the Herfindahl index (each variable is between zero and one). The
Herfindahl index is computed at the good level as HIi =
∑
s∈Si (Q is/Q i)
2, where Q is =
∑
t qist is the total number of clicks for good i and
seller s and Q i =
∑
s Q is is the total number of clicks for good i.
25To allow for a nonlinear relationship between the median price and the measures of price stickiness, we include a polynomial of
order two in this variable.
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Table 7. Predictors of Posted-Price Stickiness
Frequency of Absolute Size of Cross-Seller
Price Changes, Price Changes, Synchronization
percent log points Rate, percent
Weights: N Y N Y N Y
Predictors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Log number of sellers 8.7∗∗∗ 10.2∗∗∗ −0.5 −0.9 2.4∗∗∗ 2.7∗∗∗
(0.6) (0.6) (0.8) (0.7) (0.7) (0.6)
Concentration, Herfindahl index, (0,1] 18.1∗∗∗ 23.8∗∗∗ −5.1∗∗∗ −5.5∗∗∗ 10.4∗∗∗ 13.2∗∗∗
(2.6) (2.7) (1.8) (1.5) (3.0) (2.9)
Log total clicks −5.0∗∗∗ −3.9∗∗∗ −0.2 −0.1 −0.9∗∗∗ −0.6∗
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3)
Log median price 2.0∗∗ 1.0 −10.0∗∗∗ −9.9∗∗∗ 2.0∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗
(0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (0.7) (0.9) (0.7)
Log median price, squared −0.2∗∗ −0.2∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ −0.1 −0.2∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Share of price points −6.9∗∗∗ −7.4∗∗∗ 7.3∗∗∗ 6.6∗∗∗ −1.3 −0.8
(1.6) (1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1)
R2 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.05
N 14,483 14,483 17,053 17,053 9,937 9,937
Panel B: United Kingdom
Log number of sellers 4.3∗∗∗ 6.4∗∗∗ −0.8 −1.1∗∗ 3.0∗∗ 3.5∗∗∗
(1.2) (1.2) (0.5) (0.5) (1.3) (1.3)
Concentration, Herfindahl index, (0,1] 18.5∗∗∗ 23.2∗∗∗ −5.4∗∗∗ −5.7∗∗∗ 10.0∗ 12.4∗∗
(4.3) (4.3) (1.2) (1.3) (5.1) (5.3)
Log total clicks −2.5∗∗∗ −2.3∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ −2.3∗∗∗ −2.0∗∗∗
(0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.5)
Log median price 5.7∗∗∗ 5.3∗∗∗ −4.1∗∗∗ −4.9∗∗∗ 3.8∗∗ 3.9∗∗∗
(1.3) (1.1) (0.5) (0.5) (1.6) (1.4)
Log median price, squared −0.7∗∗∗ −0.6∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ −0.3 −0.3∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
Share of price points −19.6∗∗∗ −16.5∗∗∗ 11.8∗∗∗ 11.0∗∗∗ −14.1∗∗∗ −10.8∗∗∗
(1.6) (1.3) (1.1) (1.0) (2.0) (1.6)
R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.06
N 6,623 6,623 9,092 9,092 3,867 3,867
Notes: The table presents estimates of the regression of the frequency (columns 1–2), size (columns 3–4), and cross-seller synchronization (columns 5–
6) of price changes on the given set of variables. The “N” columns use the unweighted measures of price stickiness, raw median price across sellers, and
assign equal weights to each observation in the regression. The “Y” columns use the within-good click-weighted measures of price stickiness, weighted
median price across sellers, and further weight observations by the number of clicks obtained by each good (baseline weights). Concentration is mea-
sured with the Herfindahl index, normalized to be between zero and one. Price points are prices that end at 95 to 99 cents. Category fixed effects are
included but not reported. Standard errors clustered at the narrow-category level are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent the 10, 5, and 1 percent
significance level, respectively.
across stores, to use as a left-hand side variable. In this regression analysis, we control for category fixed effects
and cluster standard errors at the narrow-category level.
Results in Table 7 suggest that all these characteristics have some explanatory power. Markets with more
sellers are characterized by more flexible prices (higher frequency, lower size, and higher cross-seller synchro-
nization of price changes), which is consistent with the notion that more competition should yield more flexible
prices. Market concentration measured by the Herfindahl index, however, is associated with more flexible prices.
This result suggests that markets with three or four big players have more price competition than markets with
mostly small players. This finding is also in line with Ellison, Snyder, and Zhang (2015) arguing that managers
of small firms are less likely to monitor competitors’ prices than managers of large firms. Market size, measured
by the number of clicks, is associated with more (rather than less) price stickiness. Price flexibility increases
in the median price for low- and moderate-price goods (approximately 75 percent of goods in our sample).
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Such a pattern is consistent with the view that increased returns to search should make prices more flexible.
However, very expensive products on the platform tend to have stickier prices. Finally, the bigger is the share of
price points, the stickier are prices, suggesting that bounded rationality may play some role in price rigidity. We
conclude that properties of online markets such as product demand, a product price, and the intensity of com-
petition across sellers have strong association with the degree of price stickiness. The conclusions are largely
the same for regular prices (Appendix Table G12) and for the frequency of sales (Table G13).
3.6 Relation to Theoretical Models
Our results paint a mixed picture for standard macroeconomic models of pricing. On the one hand, online
prices indeed change more frequently than offline prices, which is consistent with reduced costs of nominal
price adjustment in e-commerce. Moreover, when we focus on prices relevant to consumers, the frequency of
price adjustment for online prices increases further. On the other hand, many properties of online prices are
hard to reconcile with lower “menu” costs. The size of price changes is similar for offline and online prices.
Synchronization rates are low across goods within a seller and across sellers within a good. These findings
present a challenge for popular modelling approaches. For example, low synchronization rates across goods
within a seller are inconsistent with current pricing models for multiproduct firms, as these models emphasize
simultaneous price changes within a firm. An increase in the frequency of price changes, combined with a stable
size of price changes, is inconsistent with basic “menu” cost models, which yield a negative relationship between
the frequency and the size of price changes. And yet, standard predictors of price stickiness account for some
variation in price stickiness across goods, so that conventional models appear to provide useful insights about
frictions affecting online price-setting. In the next section, we explore additional moments of data to shed more
light on the nature of these frictions.
4 Price Dispersion
Price dispersion is not only a key statistic entering welfare calculations (see Woodford 2003), but also a key
moment that can help to explain the sources of sticky prices and the nature of competition. For example,
Sheremirov (2015) shows that many popular macroeconomic models predict a tight link between price disper-
sion and the degree of price rigidity. In a similar spirit, establishing whether price dispersion is spatial (some
stores consistently charge more or less than others for the same good) or temporal (a store’s price moves up and
down in the price distribution over time) can help to distinguish between popular theories of price dispersion
in the industrial organization literature. With the rising availability of supermarket scanner data for brick-and-
mortar stores, properties of price dispersion have received a lot of attention recently (Clark and Vincent 2014,
Kaplan and Menzio 2015, Sheremirov 2015). Yet, previous literature calls for more research on price dispersion
in online markets, as data for large shopping platforms whose product coverage and pricing are similar to that
in brick-and-mortar stores (i.e., prices are set by sellers rather than through auctions) are in limited access.26
26Dispersion of online prices has been studied for specific markets such as books (e.g., Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003), CDs (e.g.,
Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), consumer electronics (e.g., Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004), prepaid phone cards (e.g., Ong and
Zhong 2011), travel (e.g., Clemons, Hann, and Hitt 2002), or business-to-business supplies (e.g., Ghose and Yao 2011). While analyses
of these markets are informative, these markets are unusual in many respects (e.g., Einav et al. 2015 study bidding and price behavior
in eBay auctions), and hence generalization is not straightforward. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other study with a large
coverage of sellers and goods in the e-commerce sector. However, online prices have been studied in the context of cross-border price
dispersion and exchange-rate pass-through (e.g., Boivin, Clark, and Vincent 2012, Gorodnichenko and Talavera 2017).
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Table 8. Average Dispersion of Posted Prices across Sellers
United States United Kingdom
CV, std(log p), std("), Number CV, std(log p), std("), Number
% log points log points of Goods % log points log points of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No weights 21.5 23.6 21.2
29,753
19.4 21.3 16.5
17,715
Click weighted 19.9 20.3 17.5 18.6 18.6 14.9
Notes: Columns (1)–(3) and (5)–(7) report the average dispersion of posted prices measured with the CV, std(log p), and std(") in the U.S. and U.K.,
respectively, where " is a residual from the regression of log p on good and seller fixed effects. Columns (4) and (8) report the number of goods in the
two samples. The CV is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
In this section, we document that price dispersion in online markets has a number of unexpected properties.
First, the magnitude is similar to, if not larger than, that for brick-and-mortar stores. Price dispersion remains
sizeable even when the seller fixed effects are removed. Second, price dispersion cannot be explained by inactive
sellers keeping their prices prohibitively high.27 The click-weighted measure of dispersion is only slightly smaller
than the unweighted one. Third, price dispersion rises steadily during product life. It increases by a third within
one-and-a-half years of the product introduction, and we show that this result is not due to a composition effect
as we look at the sample of long-lived products separately. Finally, the data support spatial price dispersion,
which is surprising, given that search in online markets is easy.
4.1 Intraweek Dispersion across Sellers
Measurement We use the coefficient of variation (CV) and standard deviation of log prices at a weekly fre-
quency as our preferred measures of price dispersion since (i) they capture the width of the entire price distri-
bution; and (ii) they are the ones most often reported in the literature on price dispersion.28 Once we compute
a corresponding measure of price dispersion across sellers for each good and week, we aggregate it to the good
level by taking appropriate time averages. We then compute the cross-good raw average of this measure (no
weights) and the click-weighted average . As the share of identified weekly sales is small (within the 1.3–1.7
percent range; see Table 3) and half of the products in the dataset do not have sales at all, the dispersion of
regular prices is almost the same as dispersion of posted prices. To save space, we focus on results for posted
prices and relegate results for regular prices to the appendix.
Dispersion In the United States, the CV is 22 percent and does not change materially when within- or between-
good weights are applied (20 percent with between-good weights; column 1 of Table 8). This is similar to
estimates in Kaplan and Menzio (2015) and larger than in Sheremirov (2015)—two recent studies of price
dispersion across brick-and-mortar stores.29 The standard deviation of log prices is similar to the CV (column 2
of Table 8). In the United Kingdom, the amount of price dispersion is roughly the same as in the United States:
27Because shopping platforms also work as price comparison websites, there is pressure to post only competitive prices. Otherwise,
listings with noncompetitive prices receive a low on-screen rank (i.e., such listings are less likely to appear on the first page of a search
result) and reduced quality rank, which raises the bid price for the on-screen rank in the future. Therefore, sellers with noncompetitive
prices are penalized indirectly. Such a practice to rank listings and to price on-screen bids should lead to even smaller price dispersion.
28Earlier literature often relied on relative price variability (Van Hoomissen 1988, Lach and Tsiddon 1992) or the dispersion of price
changes (Midrigan 2011). With the access to offline scanner data, many studies, however, turned their attention to price dispersion as a
better measure of market imperfections (Kaplan and Menzio 2015, Sheremirov 2015). We follow this approach. We relegate our results
for alternative measures of dispersion (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2004, 2010) to the appendix (Table G14).
29Kaplan and Menzio (2015), using the Nielsen household panel for the period between 2004 and 2009, report a CV at the UPC level
of 19 percent. Sheremirov (2015) uses the IRI scanner data for the 2001–2011 period and documents the average standard deviation
of log prices at 10 log points. The difference between the two is likely to be due to sample composition—the IRI data are for grocery
and drugstores only, while the Nielsen data also include warehouse clubs and discount stores, which can widen price distribution.
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the CV is 19 percent (regardless of the weights used; see column 5 of Table 8).
The average gap between the two lowest prices is 28 log points, while the range is 41 log points (Appendix
Table G14). Together with the fact that, on average, the value of information is less than the gap—two alterna-
tive measures of price dispersion presented in the appendix—this suggests that there is more mass in the left tail
of price distribution than in the right tail. Note that such a high degree of price dispersion cannot be explained
by small fringe sellers, as price dispersion remains very high even when we restrict our attention to large sellers
with more than a hundred products listed on the platform. This result is consistent with models that segment the
market into loyal customers (those with a strong brand preference) and shoppers (bargain-hunters who search
for best prices), in which a seller’s optimal strategy is to offer a low price for the former and the reservation price
for the latter (Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton 2006, Baye and Morgan 2009). Alternatively, if consumers face ex
ante different information sets à la Varian (1980) (i.e., some consumers are informed about price distribution,
while others are uninformed and pick a seller at random) and there is heterogeneity in marginal costs across
firms, then the most efficient firm will set the price equal to the marginal cost of the second most efficient firm
(to attract informed customers), while every other firm will charge the monopoly price since the other firms
face demand from uninformed customers only.
Dispersion Net of Seller Fixed Effects As suggested by Stigler (1961), some of the observed price dispersion
may be due to differences in the shopping experience and terms of sale. This distinction is less likely to apply to
shopping on the online platform, since consumers deal directly with a seller only when they complete a transac-
tion. Furthermore, if sellers’ reputation and differences in delivery and return policy matter, the importance of
these factors is likely to be reduced in our setting because consumers get explicit credit-card guarantees from the
issuer and “trusted seller” guarantees from the comparison site. To address this potential issue more completely,
we run the following regression:
log pist = αi + γs + "ist , (11)
where αi and γs are good and seller fixed effects, respectively, and then report the dispersion for the residuals,
which gives us price dispersion net of sellers’ heterogeneity in shipping costs, return policies, etc.30 In other
words, since the terms of sale are unlikely to change much in a relatively short period (e.g., Nakamura and
Steinsson 2008 document that shipping costs typically change once in a few years), we can use seller fixed
effects to capture the differences in reputation, delivery conditions, and return costs across sellers.
Seller fixed effects account for about 25–30 percent of variation in price dispersion across goods in the United
States and about 40 percent in the United Kingdom (columns 3 and 7 of Table 8), which is approximately double
of the corresponding contribution for offline grocery stores (Kaplan et al. 2016). While store heterogeneity is a
tangible source of price dispersion, the residual price dispersion remains high even when we use between-good
weights: the standard deviation of log prices is 17.5 log points in the United States and 14.9 log points in the
United Kingdom. Again, restricting the sample to large stores or excluding eBay-like sellers does not alter the
results materially. These magnitudes are striking given how easy it is to compare prices for a precisely defined
good across sellers in online markets.
30Controlling for time dummies does not affect the results.
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Figure 3. Cross-Seller Dispersion of Posted Prices over Product Life
Panel A: United States
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Notes: The figure plots the raw and click-weighted means (over goods) of the coefficient of variation for posted prices against the time passed since the
product introduction. Goods introduced during the first seven weeks are cut off to account for truncated observations, and only goods with duration of
life of more than a year are considered. To construct this figure, we drop one outlier, a product in “Media,” which would cause an idiosyncratic spike in
the U.S. click-weighted CV at week 44.
4.2 Dynamic Properties
Dispersion over Product Life We may observe considerable dispersion of prices across sellers, as well as
heterogeneity in the level of the dispersion across goods, because goods may be at different stages of their
product lives. For example, in the absence of shocks, price dispersion should be falling over the course of
product life as consumers learn about price distribution through search and firms collect information about
their competitors’ prices. If there is high dispersion of prices at the time a good is introduced, a high average
level of price dispersion could reflect the prevalence of recently introduced goods rather than the inability of
online markets to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. Studying how price dispersion varies over the product life
can also inform us about the nature of price rigidities. For example, Cavallo, Neiman, and Rigobon (2014) find
that the dispersion of prices across countries for a given good is effectively set at the time the good enters the
market and remains relatively stable throughout the product life.
To examine the importance of this dimension, we compute the average price dispersion across products after
h weeks since they appear in the dataset. Our measure of price dispersion over the product life is constructed
as follows. Suppose there are only two products, product 1 and product 2. If product 1 is present during, say,
weeks {5, 6,7}, and product 2 is present during weeks {7,8, 9,10}, we relabel the time variable as {1,2, 3} for
product 1 and {1, 2,3, 4} for product 2 so that time is measured in weeks after product entry rather than in
calendar weeks. Using cross-sectional price dispersion for each product and week, we compute an aggregate
measure of price dispersion over different stages of product life. In this analysis, we limit the sample to include
only goods with the duration of product life of at least a year so that our results are not due to a composition
effect. We exclude products that enter within the first four weeks of the sample period because we do not know
whether the product was introduced then or was unavailable due to a temporary stockout. We find similar
results when we use alternative cutoffs for the minimum duration of product life.
Figure 3 suggests that price dispersion increases steadily during the product life. In the United States, the
between-good weighted measure increases by a third within 70 weeks of the introduction, from 15 percent
to 20 percent. In the United Kingdom, a corresponding increase in dispersion is even bigger, from 11 to 19
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Table 9. Spatial vs. Temporal Price Dispersion
United States United Kingdom
No weights Click weighted No weights Click weighted
<5% >95% <5% >95% <5% >95% <5% >95%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1st quartile 43.0 16.3 23.1 10.4 42.4 18.1 19.9 9.7
2nd quartile 46.1 4.4 26.3 0.5 47.3 5.0 24.2 0.5
3rd quartile 43.6 5.7 31.7 0.6 45.3 6.4 32.1 0.7
4th quartile 60.1 6.5 53.0 1.7 61.6 6.4 52.8 1.6
Av. SD of fraction of time
spent in each quartile 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.28
Notes: For each price line (a time-series of prices for a good-seller), we compute the share of the period spent in each quartile of cross-seller price distri-
bution. This exercise is similar to Figure 4 in Lach (2002). The table reports the share of price lines that almost never (less than 5 percent of the time) or
almost always (more than 95 percent of the time) fall into a given quartile. The bottom line shows the average (across price lines) standard deviation of
the fractions of time spent in each quartile. Under perfectly temporal dispersion, this measure is 0, whereas under perfectly spatial dispersion, it is 0.43.
percent. Price dispersion for the unweighted measures increases as well, but at a smaller rate due to the level
effect. Hence, while a chunk of price dispersion appears when a good is introduced, there is no evidence of price
convergence over the good’s life, and heterogeneity in product lives cannot explain cross-sectional dispersion
of prices.We find similar results when we use dispersion net of seller fixed effects (Figure G7). This result is
consistent with low synchronization of prices across sellers.31
Spatial and Temporal Dispersion Macroeconomic models of price rigidity usually generate temporal price
dispersion. For example, in the Calvo model each firm is allowed to change the price randomly and therefore is
equally likely to lag and lead other firms during an adjustment period. Over a sufficiently long period, a given
firm should set its price below and above the average roughly the same amount of time. Sheremirov (2015)
shows that, for reasonable parameterizations, popular menu-cost models make a similar prediction. When a
firm responds to an inflationary shock, it sets its price above the average; as the price level steadily increases,
the firm’s price moves to the left of the price distribution and eventually falls below the average.
In contrast, many (but not all) models in the search or industrial-organization literature produce spatial price
dispersion (see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten 2010 for an overview of the literature.) Varian (1980) argues that
over time consumers should learn whether a firm charges a high price or a low price, thereby eliminating spatial
price dispersion. Consistent with this prediction, Lach (2002) presents evidence of temporal price dispersion
for brick-and-mortar stores in Israel. Given the ease of search for best prices in online markets, one might
expect that most of price dispersion would be temporal rather than spatial. Indeed, the conventional meaning
of “spatial” hardly applies to online stores.
Following Lach (2002), we first establish whether seller j’s price for good i (price line i j) is in a particular
quartile of the price distribution across all sellers of good i on corresponding date t. Then we calculate the
fraction of time that price line i j spends in a given quartile. Finally, we compute the average (unweighted and
click-weighted) fractions across goods. If price dispersion is temporal, the fractions for a given price line should
be close to 0.25; that is, a price moves along the cross-seller price distribution of good i and over time may
appear in any part of the distribution with an equal probability. If price dispersion is spatial, then price line i j
spends a disproportionate fraction of time in one of the quartiles (in an extreme case, all of the time; i.e., the
fraction for one quartile is one and the fractions for other quartiles are zeros). Regardless of whether we use
31For example, price dispersion rises over time if there is no price synchronization and idiosyncratic shocks to price changes are not
perfectly correlated,∆ log pst = "st with Corr ("i t , " j t) 6= 1. If, instead, all firms followed a common benchmark price (mean or min price
in the previous period, p¯t−1) and shocks were common, ∆ log pst = −µ(ps,t−1 − p¯t−1) + "t , price dispersion would fall over time.
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observed prices (pist) or prices net of seller fixed effects ("ist), we find strong support for spatial price dispersion
(Table 9): about one-third of price lines spend more than 95 percent of the time within one quartile of cross-
seller price distribution (column 2). The case is especially strong for the 1st quartile: in the United States,
16.3 percent of price lines are almost always in the 1st quartile (10.4 percent when click weighted; column 4).
Furthermore, between 43 percent and 60 percent of price lines (column 1) spend almost no time in a particular
quartile in the U.S. data. For example, 43 percent of price lines never appear in the first quartile (the cheapest)
and 60 percent of price lines never appear in the fourth quartile (the most expensive). The magnitudes are
comparable for the United Kingdom (columns 5–8). We plot the distribution of these fractions over price lines
i j in Appendix Figure G8.
To provide an additional summary statistic of how price lines are distributed over time, we report the average
(across price lines) standard deviation of the fractions of time spent in each quartile. To see why this metric
is useful, consider two cases. Under perfectly temporal dispersion, each store has an equal probability to be at
any quartile in any week. Then the fractions of time spent at quartiles Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 are all 0.25, and the
standard deviation is 0. Under perfectly spatial dispersion, 1/4 of the sample is always in quartile Q1, 1/4 of
the sample is always in quartile Q2, and so on. The standard deviation of the fractions for a price line is
p
3/4.32
Hence, by checking whether the average standard deviation is closer to 0 or to 0.43, we can evaluate the relative
importance of spatial vs. temporal dispersion. The last row in Table 9 shows that the standard deviation for the
United States and the United Kingdom is approximately 0.3, which is closer to spatial price dispersion. Thus,
both approaches point to potentially significant segmentation of the market.
Spatial price dispersion for a given good does not necessarily entail that stores set consistently low or high
prices for all goods. As argued by Kaplan et al. (2016), a given store may charge relatively low prices for one
set of goods and relatively high prices for another set of goods, so that the price of a typical purchase bundle is
similar to the prices of this bundle in other stores. Unfortunately, our data do not have information on purchased
baskets of goods, and thus we cannot test this theory directly. However, we conjecture that this explanation of
the observed price dispersion can offer only a partial account. Indeed, it is common for offline shoppers to buy
multiple items conditional on visiting a store. As a result, customers choose a store and then choose what goods
to buy. For online shopping, customers choose an item they would like to purchase and then choose a store that
offers the best price. As a result, online sellers have weaker incentives to price specific goods high or low while
keeping the prices of a basket constant.
4.3 Predictors of Price Dispersion
Popular macroeconomic theories of price determination emphasize three broad sources of price dispersion.
First, prices can be different across sellers because consumers face search costs.33 Second, prices may be differ-
ent because they are set at different times and frequencies (Nakamura, Nakamura, and Nakamura 2011) and
hence in response to different demand and supply conditions. This is the channel emphasized in models with
sticky prices. Third, sellers can price discriminate among consumers (Guimaraes and Sheedy 2011, Coibion,
Gorodnichenko, and Hong 2015, Kaplan and Menzio 2015, Sheremirov 2015). To explore the importance of
these channels, we regress the standard deviation of log prices on variables measuring market power, returns
to search, and price stickiness. To preserve space, we present results for between-good click-weighted data
32The standard deviation is computed as
p
0.25× (1− 0.25)2 + 0.75× (0− 0.25)2/4 =p3/4≈ 0.43.
33Search costs affect not only price distribution but also the distribution of clicks across sellers (Koulayev 2014).
26
(Table 10) and relegate results for other measures and weighting schemes to the appendix (Tables G15 and
G16).
We tend to find that a larger number of sellers and a smaller market size (measured by the number of clicks)
are associated with smaller price dispersion.34 The absolute magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on these
two variables are similar to each other. One may interpret this result as suggesting that price dispersion is
increasing in the average number of clicks per seller. To the extent that the average number of clicks per seller
signals market power, our results indicate that barriers to entry allow online stores to charge different prices
and price discriminate among consumers, thereby generating increased price dispersion.
Consistent with predictions of models with search costs, a higher unit price, which proxies for higher returns
on search, is associated with lower price dispersion. The economic magnitude of the relationship is large: if
good A is twice as expensive as good B, good A has a 6 to 8 log points lower dispersion of prices than good B.
Predictably, products with the prevalence of price points tend to have smaller price dispersion than products for
which price points are not important.
In models of price stickiness (e.g., Calvo 1983), the higher is the frequency of price adjustment, the smaller
is price dispersion, because firms catch up with the price level faster when they are allowed to change their
prices more often. While in models with menu costs the relationship between the frequency of price changes
and price dispersion is more nuanced, Sheremirov (2015) shows that the correlation is negative for reasonable
calibrations. In contrast to this theoretical prediction, we find a positive relationship between the frequency
and price dispersion. At the same time, models with sticky prices predict a negative relationship between the
frequency of price changes and the size of price changes so that the size of price changes may be interpreted as an
alternative measure of price stickiness. If we focus on this alternative measure, then the estimated relationship
between price stickiness and price dispersion is consistent with the predictions of sticky-price models: larger
price changes are associated with larger cross-sectional price dispersion. The difference in the results for the
frequency and size of price changes suggests that price changes in online markets may be motivated by reasons
other than those emphasized by mainstream models of price setting. For example, a high frequency of price
adjustment may reflect a noisier or more intensive process of price discovery, in which sellers frequently try
different prices to probe the level and elasticity of demand, rather than being a result of fluctuations in marginal
costs.
As we discuss above, sticky-price models generate price dispersion because of staggered price adjustment. If
firms are allowed to synchronize their price changes, cross-sectional price dispersion should disappear in these
models. In line with this prediction, we find that the synchronization of price changes tends to be negatively
correlated with price dispersion.
While price discrimination can take a variety of forms, given data constraints, we use two approaches to
capture the effects of price discrimination. First, we consider how the frequency and size of sales, a mechanism
to discriminate across customers, are related to price dispersion.35 Second, we study how removing seller fixed
effects (a proxy for differences in terms of sales across stores) influences our estimates. We find that more
frequent and smaller sales tend to be associated with lower price dispersion. Again, similar to the results for the
frequency and size of regular price changes, the estimated coefficient on the size of sales has a sign predicted
34Our results do not support the finding of Stavins (2001) that price dispersion increases with competition, which was documented
for the airline market.
35For example, Sheremirov (2015) finds that dispersion for conventional stores is lower for regular prices than for posted prices; thus,
consistent with Varian (1980), one may interpret sales as a source of price dispersion.
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by popular theories, while the estimate on the frequency of sales is surprising. Perhaps, this difference suggests
heterogeneity in the purpose of sales across goods and markets. For example, a higher frequency of sales may
occur in markets where high-price stores use sales to bring their prices closer to low-price competitors, while
larger sales may be concentrated in markets where sellers have similar prices and use sales to differentiate
themselves from the pack. We also find that removing seller fixed effects attenuates the estimates somewhat
but does not affect the qualitative conclusions.
Obviously, these results are not causal, but the estimates suggest that multiple sources of price dispersion are
likely at play. Search costs, price stickiness, and price discrimination are predictors of observed price dispersion
in online market. Controlling for one of the sources of price dispersion does not appear to change estimates on
variables proxying for other sources of price dispersion.
4.4 Relation to Theoretical Models
We document considerable dispersion of online prices for precisely defined goods, with differences in terms of
trade across sellers being a relatively small source of the dispersion. Two findings are particularly challenging
for models emphasizing search frictions. First, price dispersion is increasing over the product cycle, whereas
search models tend to predict decreasing price dispersion. Second, this class of models tends to give rise to
temporal price dispersion, with sellers moving up and down in the price distribution as a result of their mixed
strategies. Conventional Calvo and “menu” cost models also predict temporal price dispersion, as the stochastic
timing of price adjustment and random shocks put sellers’ prices in different parts of the price distribution.
In contrast, we show that price dispersion is closer to being spatial; that is, sellers charge consistently low
or consistently high prices relative to their competitors. However, standard models of pricing do have teeth:
the estimated relationships between price dispersion and frictions emphasized by standard models suggest that
these workhorse models can account for some variation in the data. In the next section, we focus on the dynamics
of price adjustment in response to fluctuations in demand, so that we can have a better understanding of which
models have best fit.
5 Dynamic Pricing
E-commerce has been long poised to adopt dynamic pricing: online sellers can, in principle, change their prices
automatically in response to anticipated variation in demand (throughout the week, month, or year) or cur-
rent market conditions (competitors’ prices, number of customers, inventories, etc.).36 In fact, it is already
widely used in a few industries. For example, airlines and hotels set their prices based on when a reservation is
made, whether a trip includes a weekend stayover, and the number of available seats or rooms (see Bilotkach,
Gorodnichenko, and Talavera 2010, 2012). Although dynamic pricing has obvious advantages (boosting profits
through price discrimination, using price experimentation to obtain real-time estimates of demand elasticity),
excessive use of dynamic pricing may alienate consumers and harm a firm’s reputation. For example, dynamic
36For example, Deck and Wilson (2003) study theoretical properties of three “automated algorithms” responding to competitors’
prices: undercutting, low-price matching, and trigger pricing. Although we do not have information on whether these algorithms were
used by the sellers on the platform, our results provide indirect evidence that their usage was, at best, limited. Undercutting and trigger
algorithms imply large synchronization of price changes, overall, and a response to price decreases stronger than to price increases,
in particular. Low-price matching implies small price dispersion. These implications do not match empirical facts documented in
Sections 3.4 and 4.
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Figure 4. Average Price and Total Clicks for a Representative Good (headphones)
Panel A: United States
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Panel B: United Kingdom
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Notes: The red dashed line is the average unweighted price across all sellers, the blue dash-dot line shows the click-weighted average, and the black
solid line shows the log number of total clicks. Each time-series is a centered three-week moving average.
pricing can undermine long-term seller-customer relationships and intensify competition, thereby putting pres-
sure on profits.
From a macroeconomic perspective, dynamic pricing leads to increased price flexibility. Whether or not it
also changes the effects of nominal shocks depends on what firms respond to. If firms adjust their prices only
in response to transitory sector-specific shocks, increased price flexibility does not make monetary policy less
powerful. If firms also react to changes in the current state of the economy, including policymakers’ decisions,
dynamic pricing can lead to a lower degree of monetary non-neutrality. Under dynamic pricing, not only the
frequency but also the timing of price changes matters. For example, Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) report that,
due to uneven staggering of wage contracts, the effect of monetary-policy shocks on output depends on the
quarter in which the shock occurs. One might expect that this effect would be amplified in online markets.
To shed new light on the use of dynamic pricing by online retailers, we consider different ways through
which it can affect price flexibility. First, we look at low-frequency anticipated variation in demand due to
holiday sales such as Black Friday and Cyber Monday (in the United States) or Boxing Day (in the United
Kingdom). Second, we look at the reaction of prices to high-frequency variation in demand. We examine how
online demand (proxied by the number of clicks) and prices vary over days of the week and month.
5.1 Holiday Sales
To have long time-series and to keep exposition clear, we focus our analysis on a popular model of headphones
that received many clicks in the sample. Figure 4 plots the time-series of the mean price over sellers in a given
week, p¯t =
∑
s∈St pst/St , the click-weighted mean price, p¯
w
t =
∑
s∈St (qst/Q t)pst , and the log of the total number
of clicks, logQ t = log
∑
s∈St qst .
37 In each country and each year, the number of clicks goes up and the average
price goes down during the holiday sales. This finding is consistent with Warner and Barsky (1995), who find
that brick-and-mortar stores choose to time price markdowns to periods of high-intensity demand. Notably,
after the sales period, prices do not go back to their presale level but instead permanently settle at a new, lower
value.
37We find similar results when we consider alternative measures of prices (median, minimum, etc.).
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Figure 5. Price Adjustment during Holiday Sales, centered three-week moving average
Panel A: Weighted Freq. of Regular Price Changes, U.S.
T
ha
n
ks
gi
vi
n
g
C
hr
is
tm
as
T
ha
n
ks
gi
vi
n
g
C
hr
is
tm
as
10
11
12
L
og
 n
um
be
r 
of
 c
lic
ks
0
5
10
15
Sh
ar
e 
of
 g
oo
ds
 w
it
h
a 
pr
ic
e 
in
cr
ea
se
/d
ec
re
as
e,
 %
2010w26 2011w1 2011w26 2012w1
Week
Panel B: Weighted Freq. of Regular Price Changes, U.K.
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Panel C: Weighted Abs. Size of Regular Price Changes, U.S.
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Panel E: Frequency of Sales, U.S.
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Panel G: Absolute Size of Sales, U.S.
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We observe a similar but weaker pattern when we aggregate across goods. Figure 5 shows that the fre-
quency of regular price decreases rises relative to the frequency of regular price increases when we compare
Thanksgiving or Christmas weeks with the weeks preceding or following the holiday season. Likewise, sales
tend to be deeper and more widespread during the season. There seems to be no evidence that the size of
regular price increases and decreases behaves differentially during the season than in off-season weeks. One
should, however, take these observations with a grain of salt, since the time-series for these variables are noisy
and we only observe two episodes of the holiday season.
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Table 11. Intraweek Variation in Prices and Clicks
United States United Kingdom
Log Deviation from Log Deviation from
Weekly Median, log points Weekly Median, log points
Click Share, Total Mean Weighted Click Share, Total Mean Weighted
percent Clicks Price Mean Price percent Clicks Price Mean Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Monday 16.2 10.0 −0.1 −0.0 16.0 8.4 −0.1 −0.2
Tuesday 15.5 6.4 0.2 0.0 15.7 6.6 0.0 0.0
Wednesday 14.8 3.8 0.5 0.0 15.0 3.4 1.2 0.0
Thursday 14.3 0.0 1.4 0.1 14.8 0.0 2.0 1.5
Friday 13.3 −6.6 2.0 2.8 13.1 −8.9 3.2 3.3
Saturday 12.1 −16.0 −3.0 −0.8 11.8 −19.0 −2.0 −0.1
Sunday 13.8 −4.4 −5.4 −1.9 13.6 −6.6 −5.5 −4.9
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) report the share of clicks by day of the week, columns (2) and (6) the median (across weeks) deviation of the number of
clicks on that day from the median day within the same week, columns (3) and (7) the same deviation for the raw mean price, and columns (4) and (8)
for the click-weighted mean price. Weeks are defined as Monday to Sunday to keep adjacent weekend days within the same week. Days before the first
Monday and after the last Sunday of the sample are dropped. The sample period is between Monday, May 3, 2010, and Sunday, February 5, 2012.
5.2 Intraweek Variation
Table 11 reports the deviation of log prices and total clicks from the weekly median, as well as the share of total
clicks by day of the week. In each country, almost one-third of the total number of clicks occur on Mondays
and Tuesdays—6 percentage points more than on Saturdays and Sundays, when the shopping activity on the
platform is the lowest. In contrast, the shopping activity in brick-and-mortar stores is the highest on weekends
(BLS 2014, Koustas 2014), indicating potential complementarity of online and offline shopping (people shop
online during the workweek, while shopping offline on the weekend). In the United States, consumers generate
10 log points more clicks on Mondays than on the median day of the same week; on Saturdays, however, this
measure is 16 log points lower than the median (8.4 and 19.0 log points, respectively, in the U.K. data). At the
same time, Monday prices are within 0.2 log points from the median in both countries, while Saturday prices
are 3 log points lower than the weekly median in the United States (2 log points in the United Kingdom). When
the shopping intensity drops over the weekend, more high-price sellers receive no clicks at all, which explains
most of the deviation in the raw mean price: click-weighted prices on Saturdays are only 0.8 and 0.1 log points
lower than the median in each country, respectively. In summary, the intraweek variation is significantly smaller
in prices than in the number of clicks, and the two are not perceptibly related. If anything, prices are slightly
lower on the weekend, when the demand intensity on the online platform is lower, thereby contradicting the
Warner-Barsky hypothesis.
5.3 Intramonth Variation
Figure 6 shows that the intramonth variation of the number of clicks also significantly exceeds that of the average
price, a fact that also holds within product categories. Specifically, we plot the median (over months) deviation
of the total number of clicks as well as the raw and click-weighted mean price from the corresponding monthly
median. While the number of clicks varies by 5 log points from each side of the median—at the extreme, the
deviations can be almost 10 log points—both measures of price deviations are consistently within 1 log point
of the median. Consistent with Olafsson and Pagel (2016), in both countries, consumers are significantly more
active in the first half of the month—and close to payday—than in the second half, with an additional spike
in activity around the 15th day of a month in the United States (as some consumers are paid biweekly). In a
pattern similar to the intraweek case, prices do not appear to respond to intramonth variation in demand.
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Figure 6. Intramonth Variation in Prices and Clicks
Panel A: United States
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Notes: The red dashed line shows the median (over months) deviation of the raw mean log price on a given day from the median day of the same month,
the blue dash-dot line shows the same deviation for the between-good, click-weighted mean, and the black solid line shows the deviation for the total
number of clicks. The sample period is between May 1, 2010, and January 31, 2012.
5.4 Relation to Theoretical Models
Similar to offline prices, online prices appear to react to changes in demand (proxied with clicks) at low frequen-
cies. At the same time, we document that online prices are insensitive to variation in demand at higher frequen-
cies. Specifically, online prices do not appear to respond to considerable intraweek or intramonth variation in
demand. Given that this variation in demand is predictable, standard models emphasizing the state-dependent
nature of price adjustment should have difficulties explaining differential sensitivity of prices to low- and high-
frequency variation in demand. Similarly, while search models can explain greater flexibility and lower prices
in times of peak demand (e.g., Christmas), it is not clear why firms in this setting would choose not to respond
to predictable spikes in demand at high frequencies (e.g., Mondays). Our results may lend some support to
models emphasizing the role of customer capital in price-setting, as changing prices based on the time of the
day or the day of the week may negatively affect the seller’s reputation and erode its customer base. We leave
exploration of this channel to future research.
6 Concluding Remarks
The internet offers seemingly limitless opportunities to the retail sector by enabling sellers to collect and process
massive amounts of data to tailor prices and product characteristics to specific whims of consumers and ever-
changing economic conditions. A popular view holds that prices for goods and services sold online should
approach (if not now, then eventually) the flexibility of auction prices or stock prices. Indeed, the internet
makes it trivial to employ dynamic pricing and to compare prices across sellers: the best price is just a few clicks
away, the physical location of online sellers is largely irrelevant, and numerous services advise online shoppers
on when and where to buy a good they desire.
Using the unique richness of our dataset, which not only includes a very broad coverage of goods over a long
time period but also provides a proxy (clicks) for quantities associated with price quotes, we find that online
prices indeed change more frequently than prices in brick-and-mortar stores. Furthermore, click-weighted pric-
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ing moments point to a greater flexibility for price quotes that matter to consumers. However, we also document
that online prices demonstrate tangible imperfections such as stickiness, low synchronization of changes, large
cross-sectional dispersion, and low sensitivity to predictable fluctuations in demand, quantitatively similar to
offline prices. Hence, consistent with Blinder (1994), Rotemberg (2011), and others, the cost of price change
may stem not only from physical costs of changing price tags or information costs but also from psychological
costs of alienating consumers by breaking implicit price contracts. Our results also point to a potentially non-
trivial size of search costs (e.g., due to obfuscation, as in Ellison and Ellison 2009), despite the convenience and
efficiency of ever-improving search engines.
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Appendix
A A Typical Shopping Platform
E-commerce is an extraordinarily dynamic market. To provide a sense of where price comparison websites stand
relative to each other, we use reports compiled by CPC Strategy, an e-commerce consultancy and market research
firm (Figure A1). Despite the fact that the market leader has 2–3 times higher traffic and revenue than its competi-
tors, there is less discrepancy among other players. The cost of sale on paid platforms averaged around 20 percent
during our sample period, while the conversion rate varied between 1 and 3 percent. The budgets vary based on
scales of sellers, ranging from about $10 thousand per month for a small business to about $4 million for a giant
seller.1
As an example, we provide some more detailed statistics for Google Shopping, one of the leading platforms.
The platform provides two bidding strategies: (i) a seller can manually set bids for a click (e.g., 20 cents per click);
or (ii) use the platform’s clicks-maximizing algorithm. CPC Strategy (2017) reports that in 2016 the average cost
per click was about 42 cents, ranging from 20 cents for cosmetic products to $1.61 for luggage-and-travel products
(Table A1). Both the daily budget and bidding strategy are essential for an efficient listing campaign. When a
customer searches for a given product, offers with the highest bids are shown first. When a seller manually chooses
a very low price per click, their products may appear on the last page of the search result, providing virtually no
visibility.
Our data come from an online platform-aggregator where sellers advertise their product. In order to be listed,
each seller has to provide (1) product data feed, (2) budget, and (3) bidding strategy. The data feed contains
detailed product information, namely product name, description, price, availability, product category, as well as
shipping and tax expenses. Sellers can regularly update their inventory/product data to maintain high accuracy.
After finishing with product feed, sellers allocate their daily budgets, as well as provide information about target
customers (e.g., currency, time zone, country of sale).
Figures A2 and A3 provide an example of how a search result for a particular good is seen by customers in
a typical shopping platform. Available information includes the product’s name and image, a brief description,
the number of reviews, the minimum price online, as well as information about online sellers of the good. The
on-screen order of sellers is based on their quality rank and a bid price a seller chooses to pay per click, but the
consumer can re-sort sellers by the average review score and the base or total price. Figure A4 provides the list of
choices the seller makes on a typical platform: a geographical location of viewers and a language they speak, as well
as a bid for the cost per click and the daily budget. Figure A5 provides an example of the ad campaign information
available to sellers. It includes the number of clicks, impressions (display of the listing), and conversions (specific
actions, such as a purchase, on the seller’s website), as well as the click-through rate (clicks divided by impressions),
the average cost per click and conversion, and the total cost of the ad.
1For details, see http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2015/05/21/how-much-does-adwords-cost.
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Figure A1. Price Comparison Websites
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Table A1. An Example of Online Shopping Platform: Google Shopping, U.S. 2016 Data
Click-through Click-to-Sale Average Order Return on Cost
Product Category Rate, % Conversion Rate, % Value, $ Ad Spending, % per Click, $
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apparel 0.78 3.67 40.61 565 0.26
Appliances 1.43 1.62 230.78 567 0.66
Art Supplies 1.62 1.66 78.45 412 0.32
Automotive 1.41 1.50 169.95 750 0.34
Babies and Kids 0.89 1.42 188.13 707 0.38
Beauty and Cosmetics 1.05 2.79 47.80 289 0.46
Books, Music, and Gifts 1.37 2.22 68.42 483 0.31
Cosmetics 1.90 2.49 30.75 383 0.20
Electronics 1.49 1.95 79.10 381 0.41
Food and Grocery 1.47 1.43 179.80 619 0.42
Footwear 1.17 2.18 119.04 627 0.41
Health and Fitness 1.36 2.44 111.11 446 0.61
Home 1.98 3.76 49.44 226 0.82
Home and Furniture 0.89 1.51 233.55 614 0.57
Luggage and Travel 0.91 1.08 549.70 369 1.61
Medical 1.35 1.75 277.51 693 0.70
Office 1.10 2.31 151.21 376 0.93
Outdoor 1.60 2.91 113.61 911 0.36
Pet Supplies 1.29 6.35 36.50 440 0.53
Sports and Outdoors 1.49 1.97 135.71 623 0.43
Tools 1.23 1.15 277.91 827 0.39
Toys 1.03 0.75 240.12 349 0.51
Watches and Jewelry 0.85 0.61 1,190.31 993 0.73
Other 1.55 3.13 69.66 396 0.55
All Goods 1.20 2.46 91.70 542 0.42
Source: CPC Strategy (2017).
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Figure A2. Shopping Platform Screenshot: A Product Listing in the U.S.
Notes: The screenshot was taken in June 2015 from a typical online shopping platform in the U.S.
iii
Figure A3. Shopping Platform Screenshot: A Product Listing in the U.K.
Notes: The screenshot was taken in June 2015 from a typical online shopping platform in the U.K.
iv
Figure A4. Shopping Platform Screenshot: Advertiser Account
Notes: The screenshot was taken in December 2012 from a typical online shopping platform. Black boxes mask the name of the platform
to highlight that it does not necessarily represent the data provider.
v
Figure A5. Shopping Platform Screenshot: Ad Summary
Notes: The screenshot was taken in December 2012 from a typical online shopping platform. Black boxes mask the name of the platform
to highlight that it does not necessarily represent the data provider.
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B Data Processing and Aggregation
The dataset,1 as supplied by the data provider, contains a sample of 52,788 goods across 27,315 sellers in the
United States and 52,804 goods across 8,757 sellers in the United Kingdom for the period from May 1, 2010, to
February 7, 2012. We minimally process the data to deal with omissions, duplications, and inconsistencies. First,
we drop prices denominated in a foreign currency, leaving only those in the dollar and sterling for each country,
respectively. Second, we drop prices above 500,000 as those are likely to stand for errors and missing values; in
fact, most prices are below 5,000 dollars. This leaves us with 52,776 and 52,767 goods and 27,308 and 8,757
sellers in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. Finally, in a small number of cases we have more
than one daily observation for the same country, seller, and good. If the duplicated observations appear to have
the same price, we aggregate them in one data point by summing over clicks. If, instead, prices differ, we take the
mode price, sum over clicks, and drop price quotes different from the mode.2 These transformations affect a tiny
share of observations and our assumptions do not affect the results in any meaningful way.
Since the data contain many missing values at the daily frequency (no clicks for a particular quote line on a
given day) and to enhance comparison with existing studies, we aggregate the data to the weekly frequency by
taking the mode price for a good, seller, and week.3 To show that this aggregation procedure does not lead to a
significant loss in variation, we compute the share of intraweek price variation in total daily variation for each good
and seller:
ωis =
bVt log pist − log pweeklyist bVt [log pist] , (B1)
where pist is the daily price, p
weekly
ist is the mode price within a given week, and bV is the sample variance. In
line with our usual approach, we then compute the raw mean over sellers (no weights), ω¯i =
∑
s∈Si ωis/Si , and
the click-weighted mean (within goods), ω¯wi =
∑
s∈Si Q isωis/Q i; the average of ω¯
w
i with between-good weights
Wi = Q i/Q is also computed. With no weights or within-good weights only, the share of intraweek variation in
prices for the median good is zero; with between-good weights, it is around 13 percent in the United States and
11 percent in the United Kingdom (Table B1). Hence, goods that receive a small number of clicks have almost no
intraweek variation in prices (and also a lot of missing values when no one clicks on them); the intraweek variation
for popular goods is reasonably small and does not seem to create any problems for aggregation. Table B2 shows
that intraday price changes are relatively rare on this platform during the sample period.
1All tables and figures in the appendix are based on proprietary data, provided on condition of nondisclosure, unless specified otherwise.
2When we have more than one mode for duplicated observations, we use the smallest one since we know that smaller prices receive
more clicks. We prefer the mode to the mean or the median in order not to generate artificial price quotes, which may spuriously break
price spells.
3When there is more than one mode, we keep the one with the earliest first occurrence.
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Table B1. Share of Intraweek Price Variation in Total Daily Variation, percent
No Weights Within-Good Weights Between-Good Weights
Standard Standard Standard Number
Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
United States 5.1 13.0 0.0 3.0 8.9 0.0 14.6 12.1 12.9 52, 776
United Kingdom 5.0 15.4 0.0 1.8 8.5 0.0 13.1 12.3 10.6 52, 767
Source: Authors’ calculations based on proprietary data, provided on condition of nondisclosure.
Table B2. High-Frequency Price Changes: Intraday and Adjacent Days
United States United Kingdom
Observations Percent Observations Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No price changes 3, 798,599 96.50 1, 264,830 96.93
Price changes 137,794 3.50 40,031 3.07
Price changes on adjacent days 112,122 2.85 37,480 2.87
Price changes within a day 25,672 0.65 2,551 0.20
1 22,898 0.58 2,256 0.17
2 1,723 0.04 175 0.01
3 444 0.01 56 0.00
>3 607 0.02 64 0.00
Total 3, 936,393 100.00 1, 304,861 100.00
viii
C Results with Within-Good Weights: Tables and Figures
Table C1. Distribution of Prices, local currency
Mean Log Price Mean Price
Standard 5th Per- 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number
Mean Deviation centile centile Median centile centile of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
No weights 3.37 1.53 4 11 25 71 474
52,776Within-good weights 3.37 1.53 4 11 24 70 466
Between-good weights (baseline) 4.15 1.51 7 22 61 192 852
Panel B: United Kingdom
No weights 3.13 1.56 3 8 19 57 381
52,767Within-good weights 3.13 1.56 3 8 19 56 377
Between-good weights (baseline) 3.82 1.44 5 17 48 134 473
Notes: Columns (1)–(2) show moments of the distribution of the average (for a good) log price, log pi , Columns (3)–(7) of the average price, p¯i , and Column
(8) the total number of goods, N . See Table 2 in the main text.
Table C2. Frequency and Size of Sales
One-Week Filter Two-Week Filter
Mean Standard Med. Med. Mean Standard Med. Med. Number
Freq. Deviation Freq. Size Freq. Deviation Freq. Size of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: United States
No Imputation
No weights 1.3 3.1 0.0 10.5 1.9 3.9 0.0 10.5 10, 567
Within-good weights 1.5 3.2 0.0 4.8 2.2 4.1 0.0 5.4 10,567
Between-good weights 1.7 1.9 1.4 4.4 2.6 2.5 2.2 4.8 10, 567
With Imputation
No weights 1.6 3.5 0.0 11.9 2.2 4.2 0.0 11.9 21, 452
Within-good weights 1.8 3.7 0.0 5.2 2.6 4.4 0.0 5.8 21,452
Between-good weights 1.9 1.9 1.6 4.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 5.3 21, 452
Offline Stores 1.9 n.a. n.a. 29.5
Panel B: United Kingdom
No Imputation
No weights 0.9 2.9 0.0 5.7 1.3 3.7 0.0 5.7 4, 464
Within-good weights 1.0 3.0 0.0 2.3 1.5 3.8 0.0 2.6 4,464
Between-good weights 1.3 1.7 1.0 2.5 1.8 2.3 1.4 2.9 4, 464
With Imputation
No weights 1.1 3.3 0.0 6.2 1.6 4.0 0.0 5.9 10, 754
Within-good weights 1.2 3.4 0.0 2.2 1.7 4.1 0.0 2.5 10,754
Between-good weights 1.4 1.8 1.0 2.5 2.0 2.4 1.5 3.2 10, 754
Offline Stores 0.3 n.a. n.a. 7.0
Notes: Column (1) reports the average weekly frequency of sales across goods (percent), Column (2) the standard deviation of the frequency across goods,
Column (3) the frequency for the median good, and Column (4) the absolute size of sales for the median good measured by the log difference between the
sale and regular price (multiplied by 100). In all the four columns, we identify sales using the one-week, two-side sale filter (see the text). Columns (5)–
(8) report the same statistics for the two-week sale filter. Column (9) reports the number of goods. The statistics for offline stores are from Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) for the U.S. and Kryvtsov and Vincent (2014) for the U.K.; the mean frequency is converted to the weekly rate. See Table 3 in the main
text.
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Table C3. Synchronization of Sales
Across Sellers of the Same Good Across Goods by the Same Seller
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
No Imputation
No weights 0.8 5.2 0.0 2.1 9.6 0.0
Within-good (-seller) weights 1.0 6.3 0.0 2.4 11.4 0.0
Between-good (-seller) weights 1.8 4.7 0.2 2.1 1.0 2.4
With Imputation
No weights 1.1 6.6 0.0 2.7 10.8 0.0
Within-good (-seller) weights 1.2 7.0 0.0 2.6 11.0 0.0
Between-good (-seller) weights 1.6 3.7 0.3 2.2 1.1 2.7
Panel B: United Kingdom
No Imputation
No weights 1.0 6.4 0.0 2.7 11.1 0.0
Within-good (-seller) weights 1.1 7.3 0.0 2.9 12.7 0.0
Between-good (-seller) weights 1.3 3.2 0.0 2.3 5.8 2.0
With Imputation
No weights 0.8 5.5 0.0 3.7 14.2 0.0
Within-good (-seller) weights 0.8 5.7 0.0 3.7 14.7 0.0
Between-good (-seller) weights 1.9 5.3 0.1 2.1 3.4 2.1
Notes: Column (1) reports the mean synchronization of price changes across sellers, Column (2) the standard deviation of this measure across goods, and
Column (3) the synchronization for the median good. Columns (4)–(6) report the same statistics for the synchronization of price changes across goods. See
Table G3 in the main text.
Table C4. Frequency and Size of Price Changes
No Imputation With Imputation
No Within Between No Within Between Offline
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Stores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 14.0 16.7 19.3 8.2 9.8 15.7 4.7
Implied duration, weeks 6.6 5.5 4.7 11.6 9.7 5.8 20.8
Median absolute size, log points 11.0 10.7 11.2 10.7
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 8.8 10.8 14.5 7.0 8.3 12.9 2.1
Implied duration, weeks 10.9 8.7 6.4 13.9 11.6 7.3 47.1
Median absolute size, log points 10.9 10.6 10.9 8.5
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 12.8 13.0 20.0 7.7 7.7 16.3 4.6
Implied duration, weeks 7.3 7.2 4.5 12.5 12.5 5.6 21.2
Median absolute size, log points 5.1 5.0 8.5 11.1
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 7.7 7.7 15.8 6.7 6.7 14.3 3.2
Implied duration, weeks 12.5 12.5 5.8 14.5 14.5 6.5 30.7
Median absolute size, log points 5.0 4.9 7.6 8.7
Notes: Column (1) reports the frequency and size of price changes when missing values are dropped and no weights are applied. Columns (2) and (3), in-
stead, aggregate using within- and between-good weights, respectively. Columns (4)–(6) report the analogous statistics when missing values are imputed (if
the next available observation is within four weeks and there is no price change). Column (7) shows the corresponding statistics from Nakamura and Steins-
son (2008) for the U.S. and Kryvtsov and Vincent (2014) for the U.K., converted to the weekly frequency. Regular prices are identified using the one-week
filter for sales. See Table 4 in the main text.
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Table C5. Synchronization Rate, percent
Synchronization across Sellers Synchronization across Goods
At At
Standard Three-Month Standard Three-Month
Mean Deviation Median Horizon Mean Deviation Median Horizon
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
No weights 10.2 18.6 0.0 41.3 17.2 27.4 1.6 45.7
Within weights 10.6 19.2 0.0 43.2 17.6 28.3 1.2 47.6
Between weights 15.7 10.0 15.1 55.2 22.5 11.6 24.9 66.7
Regular Price
No weights 7.8 16.4 0.0 40.6 14.7 25.7 0.0 46.1
Within weights 8.2 17.0 0.0 42.2 15.2 26.7 0.0 48.1
Between weights 12.8 8.6 12.6 52.8 18.3 10.3 20.3 64.3
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
No weights 14.7 24.8 0.0 50.4 19.7 26.5 8.2 55.2
Within weights 14.8 25.2 0.0 51.3 19.3 26.8 8.3 56.9
Between weights 17.9 11.1 17.9 62.6 26.1 16.7 26.0 72.0
Regular Price
No weights 12.1 22.9 0.0 50.5 16.6 24.7 5.0 54.9
Within weights 12.4 23.4 0.0 51.6 16.5 25.0 4.9 56.0
Between weights 15.6 10.5 14.3 62.9 22.4 15.3 21.2 69.6
Notes: Columns (1)–(3) report the mean, standard deviation, and median of the weekly synchronization for a good across sellers. Column (4) reports the
upper bound of synchronization at the three-month horizon. Columns (5)–(8) report the same measures for the weekly synchronization for a seller across
goods. Regular prices are identified based on the one-week, two-side filter. See Table 6 in the main text.
Figure C1. Synchronization Rate for Posted Prices by Time Horizon
Panel A: United States, for good over sellers
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Panel B: United States, for seller over goods
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Panel C: United Kingdom, for good over sellers
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Panel D: United Kingdom, for seller over goods
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Notes: Panels A and C report the upper bound synchronization across sellers at the week-h horizon, while Panels B and D synchronization across goods. The
red dashed line aggregates using the raw average, the green long-dash line uses within-good/seller click weights, and the black solid line, between weights.
The blue dash-dot line shows synchronization under the assumption of fixed probability of price adjustment, as in Calvo (1983), based on the between-good
click-weighted median frequency. The magenta long dash–dot line shows the cumulative hazard rate starting from the Calvo rate at h = 0. See Figure 2 in
the main text.
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Figure C2. Cross-Seller Dispersion of Posted Prices over Product Life
Panel A: United States
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Panel B: United Kingdom
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Notes: The figure plots the raw and click-weighted mean over goods of the coefficient of variation for posted prices against the time passed since the product
introduction. Goods introduced during the first seven weeks are cut off to account for truncated observations, and only goods with duration of life of more
than a year are considered. See Figure 3 in the main text.
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D Heterogeneity of Price Rigidity across Products: Tables and Figures
Table D1. Frequency of Price Adjustment and Implied Duration of Spells
Median Frequency, percent
Implied
Duration, Standard 5th Per- 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number
weeks Mean Deviation centile centile Median centile centile of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: United States—No Imputation
Posted Price
No weights 6.6 17.8 17.4 0.0 4.9 14.0 25.0 52.9
14,483Within-good weights 5.5 19.7 17.9 0.0 5.3 16.7 28.9 53.8
Between-good weights 4.7 19.8 11.2 2.8 11.8 19.3 26.4 40.0
Regular Price: One-Week-Decrease Filter
No weights 7.3 16.8 16.8 0.0 4.3 12.8 23.4 50.0
14,458Within-good weights 6.0 18.5 17.2 0.0 4.8 15.4 27.1 50.0
Between-good weights 5.2 18.1 10.5 2.5 10.5 17.4 24.2 37.0
Regular Price: One-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 10.9 12.3 14.0 0.0 0.4 8.8 17.3 40.0
16,332Within-good weights 8.7 13.9 14.6 0.0 0.4 10.8 20.0 40.2
Between-good weights 6.4 15.4 9.5 1.3 8.7 14.5 21.5 32.0
Regular Price: Two-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 12.2 11.7 13.9 0.0 0.0 7.9 16.7 40.0
16,110Within-good weights 10.0 13.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 9.5 19.4 40.0
Between-good weights 7.2 13.9 9.1 1.0 7.5 13.0 19.9 29.7
Panel B: United Kingdom—No Imputation
Posted Price
No weights 7.3 20.4 24.1 0.0 0.0 12.8 28.6 80.0
6,623Within-good weights 7.2 20.7 24.3 0.0 0.0 13.0 30.0 80.0
Between-good weights 4.5 20.4 13.8 0.0 9.8 20.0 28.3 42.7
Regular Price: One-Week-Decrease Filter
No weights 7.7 19.5 23.6 0.0 0.0 12.2 27.7 76.9
6,601Within-good weights 7.8 19.7 23.7 0.0 0.0 12.0 28.6 77.8
Between-good weights 4.8 19.1 13.3 0.0 8.3 18.8 26.3 41.2
Regular Price: One-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 12.5 15.2 21.1 0.0 0.0 7.7 20.0 66.7
7,738Within-good weights 12.5 15.5 21.3 0.0 0.0 7.7 20.1 66.7
Between-good weights 5.8 16.7 12.6 0.0 6.6 15.8 23.3 37.9
Regular Price: Two-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 13.5 14.7 20.8 0.0 0.0 7.1 20.0 66.7
7,582Within-good weights 13.5 14.9 21.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 20.0 66.7
Between-good weights 6.2 15.8 12.2 0.0 6.4 15.0 22.4 36.6
Panel C: United States—With Imputation
Posted Price
No weights 11.6 11.9 13.7 0.0 2.5 8.2 16.1 38.9
14,483Within-good weights 9.7 13.3 14.2 0.0 2.6 9.8 19.2 40.0
Between-good weights 5.8 16.6 10.4 1.6 8.9 15.7 23.2 35.8
Regular Price: One-Week-Decrease Filter
No weights 12.7 11.2 13.1 0.0 2.3 7.5 15.0 36.7
14,458Within-good weights 10.6 12.4 13.6 0.0 2.4 9.0 17.9 38.2
Between-good weights 6.6 15.1 9.7 1.2 8.0 14.1 20.9 31.9
Regular Price: One-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 13.9 10.5 12.7 0.0 2.0 7.0 14.3 34.5
14,425Within-good weights 11.6 11.6 13.1 0.0 2.1 8.3 16.7 36.4
Between-good weights 7.3 14.0 9.2 1.0 7.2 12.9 19.7 29.7
Regular Price: Two-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 15.5 9.7 12.2 0.0 1.5 6.3 12.9 33.3
14,385Within-good weights 13.4 10.7 12.6 0.0 1.6 7.2 15.1 34.0
Between-good weights 8.3 12.6 8.6 0.7 6.2 11.4 17.9 27.3
xiv
Table D1. Frequency of Price Adjustment and Implied Duration of Spells (cont.)
Median Frequency, percent
Implied
Duration, Standard 5th Per- 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number
weeks Mean Deviation centile centile Median centile centile of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel D: United Kingdom—With Imputation
Posted Price
No weights 12.5 15.9 21.8 0.0 0.0 7.7 20.8 70.4
6,623Within-good weights 12.5 16.1 21.9 0.0 0.0 7.7 21.4 71.4
Between-good weights 5.6 17.5 12.9 0.0 6.8 16.3 26.9 38.7
Regular Price: One-Week-Decrease Filter
No weights 13.5 15.2 21.3 0.0 0.0 7.1 20.0 68.8
6,601Within-good weights 13.7 15.3 21.4 0.0 0.0 7.0 20.0 69.2
Between-good weights 6.0 16.4 12.5 0.0 6.3 15.3 24.1 37.2
Regular Price: One-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 14.5 14.7 21.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 18.8 66.7
6,587Within-good weights 14.5 14.7 21.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 19.1 66.7
Between-good weights 6.5 15.5 12.2 0.0 5.8 14.3 21.9 36.0
Regular Price: Two-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 15.5 14.0 20.4 0.0 0.0 6.3 17.6 64.7
6,560Within-good weights 15.9 14.0 20.5 0.0 0.0 6.1 17.6 66.7
Between-good weights 7.0 14.5 11.8 0.0 5.5 13.3 20.9 34.9
Notes: This table reproduces the frequency of price adjustment and median implied duration from Table 4, adding two additional sale filters and showing
moments of the distribution of the frequency across goods.
Table D2. Frequency of Price Increases and Decreases
Standard 5th Per- 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number
Mean Deviation centile centile Median centile centile of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price Increases
No weights 8.3 9.7 0.0 0.0 5.9 12.2 27.3
14,483Within-good weights 9.2 9.8 0.0 0.0 7.2 14.1 27.8
Between-good weights 8.9 5.4 0.9 5.4 8.6 12.0 18.7
Posted Price Decreases
No weights 9.5 11.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 14.2 31.9
14,483Within-good weights 10.5 11.2 0.0 0.0 8.3 15.9 32.7
Between-good weights 10.9 6.9 0.8 5.8 10.1 15.0 22.8
Regular Price Increases
No weights 5.7 7.9 0.0 0.0 3.3 8.3 20.0
16,332Within-good weights 6.4 8.1 0.0 0.0 4.2 9.8 20.0
Between-good weights 6.8 4.4 0.0 3.7 6.4 9.2 14.3
Regular Price Decreases
No weights 6.6 9.1 0.0 0.0 3.7 9.5 23.2
16,332Within-good weights 7.4 9.4 0.0 0.0 4.8 11.2 25.0
Between-good weights 8.6 6.1 0.0 4.2 7.7 12.0 19.2
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price Increases
No weights 10.4 14.2 0.0 0.0 5.6 15.0 40.0
6,623Within-good weights 10.5 14.2 0.0 0.0 5.7 15.1 40.0
Between-good weights 9.8 7.2 0.0 4.6 9.0 13.1 20.3
Posted Price Decreases
No weights 10.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 5.3 14.9 40.0
6,623Within-good weights 10.2 13.4 0.0 0.0 5.4 15.8 40.0
Between-good weights 10.6 7.8 0.0 4.2 10.4 15.0 24.0
Regular Price Increases
No weights 7.8 12.6 0.0 0.0 2.3 10.8 35.7
7,738Within-good weights 7.9 12.6 0.0 0.0 2.5 11.1 36.7
Between-good weights 8.0 6.6 0.0 3.4 7.2 11.9 18.1
Regular Price Decreases
No weights 7.4 11.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 10.4 33.3
7,738Within-good weights 7.6 11.8 0.0 0.0 1.7 11.1 33.3
Between-good weights 8.7 7.2 0.0 2.7 8.1 12.9 20.8
Notes: This table shows the distribution of the frequency of price increases and decreases across goods.
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Table D3. Cross-Good Heterogeneity of the Size of Price Changes, log points
Standard 5th Per- 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number
Mean Deviation centile centile Median centile centile of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
All Changes
No weights 0.6 17.6 −21.9 −3.5 0.0 3.9 26.0
17,053Within-good weights 0.2 18.2 −22.9 −4.5 −0.3 4.0 26.8
Between-good weights −2.0 6.6 −10.9 −3.9 −1.6 0.3 5.8
Absolute Value
No weights 16.3 17.2 1.0 5.4 11.0 20.4 51.3
17,053Within-good weights 16.3 17.4 1.0 5.2 10.7 20.5 52.2
Between-good weights 13.7 9.8 4.2 7.5 11.2 16.7 30.6
Price Increases
No weights 17.5 18.3 1.0 5.7 11.8 22.2 55.0
13,795Within-good weights 17.3 18.6 1.0 5.4 11.3 22.0 56.4
Between-good weights 13.9 10.7 3.7 7.2 11.2 17.1 33.3
Price Decreases
No weights 15.4 17.0 0.9 4.9 10.3 19.3 49.6
14,023Within-good weights 15.6 17.4 0.9 4.7 10.1 19.7 50.9
Between-good weights 13.6 10.4 3.6 7.3 10.8 16.4 32.3
Panel B: United Kingdom
All Changes
No weights 0.5 13.2 −15.2 −1.8 0.2 2.6 17.5
9,092Within-good weights 0.2 13.8 −16.6 −2.4 0.1 2.5 18.2
Between-good weights −1.3 6.2 −9.7 −3.4 −0.6 0.7 5.5
Absolute Value
No weights 9.5 13.2 0.4 1.7 5.1 11.8 35.2
9,092Within-good weights 9.7 13.5 0.4 1.7 5.0 11.8 35.9
Between-good weights 10.1 8.0 1.8 4.6 8.5 14.0 23.6
Price Increases
No weights 9.9 13.6 0.4 1.7 5.3 12.3 35.2
6,983Within-good weights 9.9 13.8 0.4 1.7 5.1 12.1 35.7
Between-good weights 9.8 8.6 1.4 4.0 8.0 13.3 26.4
Price Decreases
No weights 9.4 13.5 0.4 1.6 4.7 11.3 34.8
6,717Within-good weights 9.6 13.9 0.4 1.5 4.7 11.7 36.3
Between-good weights 10.4 8.6 1.6 4.9 7.7 14.8 23.2
Notes: This table reproduces the size of price changes for posted prices from Table 4, adding actual (as opposed to absolute values of) changes and showing
moments of the distribution across goods.
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Table D4. The Size of Absolute Price Changes for Posted and Regular Prices, log points
Standard 5th Per- 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number
Mean Deviation centile centile Median centile centile of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
No weights 16.3 17.2 1.0 5.4 11.0 20.4 51.3
17,053Within-good weights 16.3 17.4 1.0 5.2 10.7 20.5 52.2
Between-good weights 13.7 9.8 4.2 7.5 11.2 16.7 30.6
Regular Price: One-Week-Decrease Filter
No weights 16.3 17.2 1.0 5.4 11.0 20.5 51.2
16,983Within-good weights 16.2 17.4 1.0 5.2 10.7 20.5 52.0
Between-good weights 13.5 9.7 4.1 7.5 11.0 16.6 30.6
Regular Price: One-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 16.1 17.0 1.0 5.3 10.9 20.2 50.7
16,877Within-good weights 16.0 17.3 1.0 5.1 10.6 20.3 51.6
Between-good weights 13.3 9.6 4.0 7.5 10.9 16.6 30.0
Regular Price: Two-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 15.9 17.0 1.0 5.2 10.7 20.0 50.3
16,612Within-good weights 15.9 17.2 1.0 5.1 10.5 20.1 51.2
Between-good weights 13.1 9.5 4.0 7.4 10.6 16.1 29.8
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
No weights 9.5 13.2 0.4 1.7 5.1 11.8 35.2
9,092Within-good weights 9.7 13.5 0.4 1.7 5.0 11.8 35.9
Between-good weights 10.1 8.0 1.8 4.6 8.5 14.0 23.6
Regular Price: One-Week-Decrease Filter
No weights 9.5 13.1 0.4 1.7 5.1 11.8 34.8
9,044Within-good weights 9.6 13.4 0.4 1.7 5.0 11.8 35.7
Between-good weights 10.0 8.0 1.8 4.6 7.7 13.9 23.5
Regular Price: One-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 9.4 13.0 0.4 1.7 5.0 11.6 34.6
8,990Within-good weights 9.5 13.3 0.4 1.7 4.9 11.7 35.3
Between-good weights 9.9 8.0 1.8 4.5 7.6 13.7 23.3
Regular Price: Two-Week Two-Side Filter
No weights 9.3 12.9 0.4 1.7 5.0 11.5 33.8
8,879Within-good weights 9.4 13.2 0.4 1.6 4.9 11.5 34.9
Between-good weights 9.8 8.0 1.8 4.5 7.4 13.6 23.5
Notes: This table reproduces the absolute size of price changes from Table 4 for different types of sale filters.
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Table D5. Synchronization Rate, percent
Standard 25th Per- 75th Per- 95th Per- Number of
Mean Deviation centile Median centile centile Goods/Sellers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: United States—Posted Prices
Synchronization across Sellers
No weights 10.2 18.6 0.0 0.0 13.5 50.0
9,937Within-good weights 10.6 19.2 0.0 0.0 14.2 48.0
Between-good weights 15.7 10.0 8.1 15.1 21.6 33.8
Synchronization across Goods
No weights 17.2 27.4 0.0 1.6 25.0 100.0
2,344Within-seller weights 17.6 28.3 0.0 1.2 23.7 100.0
Between-seller weights 22.5 11.6 12.1 24.9 31.4 31.4
Panel B: United Kingdom—Posted Prices
Synchronization across Sellers
No weights 14.7 24.8 0.0 0.0 20.0 96.3
3,867Within-good weights 14.8 25.2 0.0 0.0 19.6 96.3
Between-good weights 17.9 11.1 9.8 17.9 25.7 35.8
Synchronization across Goods
No weights 19.7 26.5 0.0 8.2 30.0 83.3
1,258Within-seller weights 19.3 26.8 0.0 8.3 26.9 85.9
Between-seller weights 26.1 16.7 12.9 26.0 34.4 57.0
Panel C: United States—Regular Prices
Synchronization across Sellers
No weights 7.8 16.4 0.0 0.0 9.1 33.3
10,280Within-good weights 8.2 17.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 37.5
Between-good weights 12.8 8.6 6.4 12.6 18.0 25.7
Synchronization across Goods
No weights 14.7 25.7 0.0 0.0 18.2 91.1
2,422Within-seller weights 15.2 26.7 0.0 0.0 18.5 94.3
Between-seller weights 18.3 10.3 9.1 20.3 25.8 25.8
Panel D: United Kingdom—Regular Prices
Synchronization across Sellers
No weights 12.1 22.9 0.0 0.0 14.8 56.3
4,005Within-good weights 12.4 23.4 0.0 0.0 15.2 69.4
Between-good weights 15.6 10.5 7.8 14.3 23.7 32.6
Synchronization across Goods
No weights 16.6 24.7 0.0 5.0 25.0 75.0
1,306Within-seller weights 16.5 25.0 0.0 4.9 22.3 75.2
Between-seller weights 22.4 15.3 11.4 21.2 29.5 49.1
Notes: This table reproduces the synchronization rate from Table 6 and reports moments of the distribution across products.
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E Price Rigidity by Product Category: Tables and Figures
Table E1. Median Frequency of Price Adjustment, percent
Posted Price Regular Price
No Within Between No Within Between Number
Category Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: United States
Apparel and Accessories 10.3 11.6 10.8 6.6 7.8 8.3 1, 101
Arts and Entertainment 10.0 12.5 8.9 5.4 6.7 5.5 949
Baby and Toddler 14.4 15.0 15.1 8.4 10.7 12.3 74
Business and Industrial 9.1 5.2 3.7 4.9 3.3 1.1 14
Cameras and Optics 11.4 12.2 33.3 6.8 7.5 24.9 503
Electronics 14.6 17.4 21.6 9.7 11.1 16.8 3, 057
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 10.3 16.1 14.4 8.8 13.2 13.2 25
Furniture 12.0 15.0 13.2 8.4 10.1 9.7 186
Hardware 13.3 16.6 15.9 8.3 10.4 11.3 879
Health and Beauty 13.5 18.2 17.6 8.3 11.7 13.1 1, 787
Home and Garden 12.6 16.3 15.2 8.0 10.5 11.8 2, 055
Luggage and Bags 12.3 12.4 12.1 8.5 8.5 9.4 378
Mature 10.0 15.1 19.9 4.9 8.0 13.2 30
Media 20.0 20.0 23.8 14.2 13.1 16.7 1, 674
Office Supplies 16.7 18.2 16.7 10.2 12.5 13.2 286
Pet Supplies 12.5 16.4 13.9 7.5 10.0 9.7 500
Services 21.6 22.7 25.5 16.2 17.5 20.5 2
Software 13.5 12.6 24.2 7.1 7.8 20.0 159
Sporting Goods 13.2 16.0 15.6 8.3 11.1 11.6 788
Toys and Games 17.0 20.3 19.9 10.9 14.3 15.4 1, 053
Vehicles and Parts 12.5 15.2 19.4 7.1 9.6 13.4 231
Not Classified 19.3 22.2 25.9 12.7 16.6 19.1 601
All Goods 14.0 16.7 19.3 8.8 10.8 14.5 16,332
Panel B: United Kingdom
Apparel and Accessories 9.5 9.1 13.0 5.3 4.5 11.1 487
Arts and Entertainment 7.3 6.5 10.1 1.7 1.9 6.2 423
Baby and Toddler 11.7 14.1 15.2 8.1 9.9 12.0 67
Business and Industrial 16.3 9.1 2.5 3.5 1.2 2.3 6
Cameras and Optics 14.3 13.7 20.2 9.7 9.5 16.3 275
Electronics 19.1 19.4 25.2 13.4 13.7 21.3 1, 695
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16
Furniture 14.3 18.2 26.1 8.0 10.0 22.9 79
Hardware 9.7 9.1 13.3 6.3 5.7 9.5 433
Health and Beauty 8.5 8.0 8.0 4.6 4.5 6.0 1, 015
Home and Garden 15.7 16.7 21.8 9.6 10.3 17.4 791
Luggage and Bags 12.5 10.8 15.6 5.9 5.9 8.1 197
Mature 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2
Media 20.0 20.0 17.6 14.3 16.7 14.3 547
Office Supplies 16.7 16.7 22.3 9.1 10.0 13.6 72
Pet Supplies 14.3 16.1 13.3 8.3 8.3 11.1 150
Services 19.0 18.4 25.3 6.7 9.5 18.0 5
Software 17.4 19.7 28.3 12.5 12.1 22.6 94
Sporting Goods 3.6 3.7 7.4 0.0 0.0 6.5 627
Toys and Games 12.5 12.5 15.3 7.1 7.2 11.7 553
Vehicles and Parts 8.3 9.1 12.1 1.3 0.9 10.8 62
Not Classified 9.1 9.0 11.1 3.2 2.7 9.6 142
All Goods 12.8 13.0 20.0 7.7 7.7 15.8 7,738
Notes: This table reproduces the median frequency of price adjustment, reported in Columns (1)–(2) of Table 4, by product category.
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Table E2. Median Absolute Size of Price Changes, log points
Posted Price Regular Price
No Within Between No Within Between Number
Category Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: United States
Apparel and Accessories 14.0 14.0 13.3 13.9 13.9 13.1 998
Arts and Entertainment 18.4 18.2 15.8 18.4 18.2 15.3 851
Baby and Toddler 16.1 16.2 15.8 15.1 15.1 16.3 73
Business and Industrial 9.9 9.6 9.1 9.8 9.3 7.3 16
Cameras and Optics 13.3 13.4 9.8 13.5 13.5 9.2 414
Electronics 14.7 14.8 13.2 14.5 14.6 12.8 2, 983
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 23.8 24.1 24.3 23.1 23.7 22.7 26
Furniture 13.7 13.4 12.5 13.2 12.8 12.3 169
Hardware 13.8 13.7 11.6 13.7 13.6 11.4 884
Health and Beauty 17.7 17.7 16.3 17.2 17.2 15.5 1, 771
Home and Garden 14.5 14.4 12.6 14.3 14.3 12.2 2, 053
Luggage and Bags 16.5 16.6 15.9 16.3 16.4 15.7 357
Mature 12.9 13.7 11.3 13.0 13.8 11.4 27
Media 19.9 19.6 16.9 19.7 19.4 16.9 2, 459
Office Supplies 18.7 18.9 14.4 18.2 18.5 14.1 303
Pet Supplies 17.9 17.8 15.5 17.6 17.6 15.2 493
Services 6.6 5.8 7.6 6.5 5.6 7.1 2
Software 14.0 14.2 13.1 14.1 14.3 13.0 145
Sporting Goods 11.1 11.3 11.6 10.9 11.1 11.5 875
Toys and Games 19.9 19.9 18.3 19.7 19.8 17.9 1, 098
Vehicles and Parts 14.6 14.4 12.0 14.1 13.9 12.7 212
Not Classified 17.7 17.6 17.5 17.5 17.5 16.6 668
All Goods 11.0 10.7 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.9 16,877
Panel B: United Kingdom
Apparel and Accessories 9.4 9.7 9.5 9.0 9.2 8.9 519
Arts and Entertainment 6.6 6.7 7.1 6.7 6.8 7.0 410
Baby and Toddler 12.8 13.1 10.0 13.0 13.3 10.1 67
Business and Industrial 7.4 7.3 16.2 7.2 7.2 16.3 6
Cameras and Optics 8.6 8.5 6.8 8.3 8.3 6.7 306
Electronics 8.2 8.3 9.0 8.0 8.2 8.9 2, 188
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 7.6 7.3 14.0 7.6 7.3 14.0 10
Furniture 6.6 6.8 9.2 6.5 6.9 9.2 74
Hardware 8.8 9.0 10.8 8.7 8.9 10.9 442
Health and Beauty 11.0 11.2 11.6 10.8 11.0 12.0 1, 040
Home and Garden 8.9 9.1 11.8 8.8 9.0 11.9 994
Luggage and Bags 9.3 9.3 10.3 9.4 9.3 10.0 217
Mature 2.9 2.9 3.8 2.9 2.9 3.8 3
Media 9.3 9.3 10.0 9.3 9.3 10.1 1, 015
Office Supplies 7.0 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.7 6.6 118
Pet Supplies 5.8 5.8 8.2 5.8 5.7 4.7 170
Services 16.2 16.6 16.6 15.6 16.1 15.8 5
Software 8.8 9.1 9.5 8.8 9.2 7.7 107
Sporting Goods 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.5 10.1 512
Toys and Games 16.8 17.1 19.3 16.5 16.8 19.3 570
Vehicles and Parts 6.9 7.0 6.3 6.4 6.4 5.8 60
Not Classified 15.3 15.5 17.6 15.3 15.5 15.9 157
All Goods 5.1 5.0 8.5 5.0 4.9 7.6 8,990
Notes: This table reproduces the median size of price change, reported in Columns (1)–(2) of Table 4, by product category.
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Table E3. Cross-Seller Synchronization Rate for Posted Prices, percent
No Weights Within-Good Weights Between-Good Weights
Standard Standard Standard Number
Category Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: United States
Apparel and Accessories 10.1 20.1 0.0 10.8 21.0 0.0 10.3 10.1 8.4 619
Arts and Entertainment 6.8 15.9 0.0 6.8 15.9 0.0 8.1 8.4 6.7 494
Baby and Toddler 7.4 10.0 4.9 9.4 13.0 7.5 13.7 8.5 11.5 49
Business and Industrial 7.1 8.8 4.9 10.2 13.7 2.0 6.7 8.5 2.0 7
Cameras and Optics 11.5 17.9 5.6 12.3 19.5 4.5 23.3 9.7 25.7 273
Electronics 12.7 18.4 7.4 13.4 19.3 7.4 18.0 8.9 18.2 1,979
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 16.0 21.1 3.1 14.0 18.7 4.9 12.0 13.3 4.9 13
Furniture 10.2 16.4 6.2 10.8 17.2 5.6 10.6 8.0 10.1 129
Hardware 7.8 17.5 0.0 8.1 18.0 0.0 10.5 8.7 10.0 521
Health and Beauty 6.5 14.6 0.0 6.9 15.4 0.0 9.9 8.8 8.0 1,117
Home and Garden 7.7 14.9 0.0 7.9 15.3 0.0 11.2 8.4 9.4 1, 275
Luggage and Bags 7.7 15.2 0.0 7.7 15.7 0.0 10.7 8.4 6.7 192
Mature 6.0 8.5 0.0 5.7 8.6 0.0 10.5 6.8 11.3 23
Media 19.0 26.7 8.3 18.5 26.7 5.7 20.7 12.6 20.1 1,084
Office Supplies 10.0 17.2 0.0 10.0 17.1 0.0 10.7 6.7 8.9 159
Pet Supplies 7.1 13.7 0.0 7.6 14.2 0.0 8.7 7.2 8.4 326
Services 17.4 n.a. 17.4 18.3 n.a. 18.3 18.3 n.a. 18.3 1
Software 9.1 16.8 0.0 9.7 17.5 0.0 15.5 5.3 17.5 95
Sporting Goods 8.8 17.7 0.0 9.0 17.8 0.0 10.9 8.0 10.5 422
Toys and Games 8.5 16.4 0.0 9.2 17.9 0.0 13.4 8.8 13.3 637
Vehicles and Parts 8.1 19.3 0.0 7.9 19.0 0.0 10.4 7.6 14.3 153
Not Classified 9.5 18.9 0.0 10.5 20.3 0.0 18.0 13.1 15.9 369
All Goods 10.2 18.6 0.0 10.6 19.2 0.0 15.7 10.0 15.1 9,937
Panel B: United Kingdom
Apparel and Accessories 9.3 19.7 0.0 9.6 20.6 0.0 9.6 9.8 7.0 226
Arts and Entertainment 10.0 21.7 0.0 9.8 21.6 0.0 9.4 8.7 9.9 162
Baby and Toddler 6.8 11.6 0.0 7.0 11.9 0.0 14.6 14.0 12.3 47
Business and Industrial 8.3 14.4 0.0 10.8 18.7 0.0 13.6 19.6 0.0 3
Cameras and Optics 10.0 15.6 0.0 10.5 16.7 0.0 19.6 13.1 14.3 146
Electronics 19.5 25.4 11.7 19.3 25.7 11.3 21.2 10.1 20.9 1,111
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3
Furniture 7.9 11.2 0.0 7.0 9.3 0.0 15.4 5.8 18.8 22
Hardware 9.7 21.1 0.0 9.9 21.4 0.0 11.2 9.0 11.1 171
Health and Beauty 10.8 21.9 0.0 11.6 22.6 0.0 11.4 11.9 5.0 523
Home and Garden 14.6 24.3 3.6 15.1 24.9 1.7 18.3 9.0 17.6 370
Luggage and Bags 12.1 23.1 0.0 10.4 21.6 0.0 9.4 11.5 4.2 67
Mature 0.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.0 1
Media 21.5 32.7 0.0 21.0 33.0 0.0 17.0 14.3 15.4 342
Office Supplies 19.4 29.1 3.2 19.4 30.5 2.8 14.8 11.7 11.7 40
Pet Supplies 2.1 7.4 0.0 3.0 9.6 0.0 12.5 10.0 18.8 31
Services 11.1 19.2 0.0 15.4 26.6 0.0 37.5 22.1 46.2 3
Software 22.9 26.7 16.3 22.0 26.2 15.8 19.5 5.6 17.9 64
Sporting Goods 8.1 20.6 0.0 8.5 21.8 0.0 7.2 10.2 3.3 201
Toys and Games 14.6 28.3 0.0 15.2 29.9 0.0 10.2 13.2 9.7 261
Vehicles and Parts 20.3 37.9 0.0 20.1 37.2 0.0 6.8 12.4 5.7 13
Not Classified 9.9 20.3 0.0 9.9 20.8 0.0 11.0 7.4 7.8 60
All Goods 14.7 24.8 0.0 14.8 25.2 0.0 17.9 11.1 17.9 3,867
Notes: This table reproduces the cross-seller synchronization rate for posted prices, reported in Columns (1)–(3) of Table 6, by product category.
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Table E4. Duration of Product Life, weeks
Truncated Halftruncated Nontruncated
Share, Share, Standard Standard Lower Number
percent percent Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Median Bound of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: United States
Apparel and Accessories 0.1 42.1 51.8 22.0 26.3 21.9 24 37.1 2, 645
Arts and Entertainment 0.4 48.9 54.0 22.7 26.5 22.9 23 40.2 2,873
Baby and Toddler 10.6 50.6 45.6 24.1 14.7 16.6 9 38.7 160
Business and Industrial 3.0 31.3 44.5 23.7 16.7 22.4 2 27.7 67
Cameras and Optics 7.7 48.6 54.8 26.1 29.3 23.7 26 46.5 978
Electronics 13.7 40.7 50.0 28.2 24.4 22.9 18 44.2 7,606
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 0.0 59.7 25.5 21.8 22.4 26.5 4 24.2 67
Furniture 8.1 52.4 53.6 25.4 29.4 24.9 30 47.2 334
Hardware 10.1 39.9 52.8 25.8 23.3 23.9 14 42.1 2, 831
Health and Beauty 0.3 53.5 53.8 22.5 28.7 22.8 28 42.3 4,425
Home and Garden 8.5 47.7 48.0 25.9 25.4 22.8 21 41.9 5, 150
Luggage and Bags 1.3 34.4 42.6 26.2 27.9 22.1 24 33.8 1,077
Mature 16.3 48.8 58.9 23.1 28.4 27.3 28 53.8 43
Media 11.3 31.4 57.3 27.4 25.2 26.3 15 42.9 14,370
Office Supplies 4.1 47.5 49.0 25.8 28.6 23.1 32 41.0 849
Pet Supplies 28.2 44.3 58.1 26.0 33.7 27.5 33 61.3 1,106
Services 11.5 34.6 55.6 31.5 26.3 22.6 28 44.1 26
Software 10.3 39.9 48.0 27.3 22.9 23.5 14 40.1 506
Sporting Goods 2.3 48.8 41.0 27.0 17.5 19.9 9 30.7 2, 335
Toys and Games 12.5 46.5 52.9 24.7 26.9 24.1 21 47.2 2,777
Vehicles and Parts 7.0 42.4 50.0 25.2 25.4 23.9 19 40.5 575
Not Classified 5.5 44.5 43.9 23.9 22.5 21.2 17 35.9 1,976
All Goods 8.5 41.5 51.7 26.2 25.3 24.1 19 42.1 52,776
Panel B: United Kingdom
Apparel and Accessories 0.0 32.1 40.3 24.4 16.3 18.8 7 24.0 2, 761
Arts and Entertainment 0.3 32.1 36.7 25.7 13.1 17.9 1 20.9 2,945
Baby and Toddler 4.1 57.4 37.8 26.2 16.3 17.2 9 31.9 169
Business and Industrial 0.0 47.9 27.7 23.8 8.0 10.1 1 17.5 48
Cameras and Optics 5.1 37.8 41.0 24.8 16.4 18.1 10 29.6 978
Electronics 7.4 36.0 42.0 28.5 18.4 21.4 8 32.4 7,693
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 0.0 50.7 25.6 16.2 13.2 15.8 3 19.5 69
Furniture 0.3 43.5 26.4 21.6 13.5 18.2 5 19.4 338
Hardware 1.4 36.5 41.2 26.6 16.5 20.5 4 26.6 2, 770
Health and Beauty 0.0 44.8 39.0 24.1 16.3 19.0 7 26.5 4,425
Home and Garden 1.0 33.8 34.7 26.5 13.2 18.0 3 21.3 5, 311
Luggage and Bags 1.4 30.5 30.3 23.6 17.2 18.3 10 22.2 1,037
Mature 0.0 26.7 10.8 19.9 9.4 13.1 2 9.7 30
Media 0.1 18.9 41.6 27.1 14.5 20.0 1 19.8 14,197
Office Supplies 2.5 28.7 31.2 24.4 15.0 17.8 6 21.6 792
Pet Supplies 2.4 34.8 38.8 31.5 15.8 23.4 2 25.7 1,145
Services 8.0 24.0 41.4 26.8 13.8 19.3 2 26.7 50
Software 7.3 34.9 46.2 28.3 17.1 21.3 5 32.8 545
Sporting Goods 0.6 44.2 30.9 21.4 16.3 17.1 10 23.2 2, 392
Toys and Games 0.7 31.8 39.1 25.8 19.3 21.9 9 26.1 3,179
Vehicles and Parts 0.8 30.2 32.4 23.1 11.2 15.3 1 18.3 620
Not Classified 0.3 35.3 27.6 22.4 13.2 16.8 4 18.6 1,273
All Goods 1.7 31.5 38.3 26.3 15.5 19.7 4 24.0 52,767
Notes: This table reproduces Table G7 by product category.
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Table E5. Average Price Dispersion
No Weights Click Weighted
Measure CV VI IQR Range Gap CV VI IQR Range Gap N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: United States
Apparel and Accessories 15.6 15.3 23.4 27.9 17.8 16.2 16.0 20.4 34.8 15.3 1, 599
Arts and Entertainment 18.8 20.3 29.9 34.3 23.4 17.1 19.1 22.2 36.1 19.2 1,718
Baby and Toddler 15.6 17.6 23.6 30.7 19.2 14.8 18.4 17.1 41.3 14.3 88
Business and Industrial 18.5 19.2 29.5 34.4 18.1 19.0 19.0 26.2 39.2 19.2 29
Cameras and Optics 13.2 15.9 21.0 26.4 17.7 12.7 18.4 16.4 45.1 12.3 631
Electronics 20.6 24.3 32.8 40.9 26.0 18.6 26.2 22.3 54.1 18.8 4,583
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 28.4 31.5 48.1 51.7 36.9 24.7 26.9 35.9 47.0 31.8 35
Furniture 15.2 16.3 22.7 29.7 15.9 15.2 17.0 18.1 37.6 12.7 232
Hardware 20.5 22.6 32.5 38.7 25.2 20.6 23.3 26.5 45.7 21.9 1, 475
Health and Beauty 17.1 18.1 26.3 31.9 20.4 19.2 19.7 23.7 43.9 18.0 2,920
Home and Garden 18.7 19.4 28.3 34.5 21.5 18.4 20.1 22.2 44.4 17.0 3, 016
Luggage and Bags 17.3 18.0 27.3 31.2 21.8 16.9 18.1 21.1 37.4 17.8 526
Mature 22.0 26.7 35.6 45.1 28.7 18.7 23.3 25.0 45.3 19.3 36
Media 29.6 36.1 50.4 57.0 41.9 31.7 44.3 50.2 76.3 41.1 7,016
Office Supplies 22.8 26.1 36.6 43.9 28.6 24.4 32.6 32.5 58.8 26.5 515
Pet Supplies 21.9 22.9 33.8 40.6 25.1 21.2 22.7 28.4 46.0 20.4 843
Services 10.1 8.6 15.4 17.9 8.6 12.4 11.0 17.0 25.1 8.1 14
Software 18.8 21.3 30.6 35.3 24.6 16.1 19.7 19.1 45.8 16.3 263
Sporting Goods 16.0 16.6 24.5 29.5 19.1 15.5 16.2 18.8 37.3 14.8 1, 014
Toys and Games 20.7 23.5 33.5 39.1 27.6 22.3 27.9 33.0 51.8 28.8 1,814
Vehicles and Parts 20.4 21.9 31.5 38.6 23.0 21.3 24.2 28.6 47.5 20.7 328
Not Classified 20.9 22.3 33.6 38.0 26.2 21.1 22.0 27.2 43.8 22.0 1,058
All Goods 21.5 24.4 34.6 40.7 27.6 19.9 24.8 26.1 50.1 21.1 29,753
Panel B: United Kingdom
Apparel and Accessories 15.9 15.1 25.0 27.0 20.4 15.9 14.4 22.0 29.2 19.3 991
Arts and Entertainment 17.7 16.5 27.4 28.7 23.6 15.0 13.6 20.9 26.1 18.8 779
Baby and Toddler 17.5 18.6 26.2 33.0 20.7 17.8 15.4 18.1 38.8 18.9 90
Business and Industrial 26.1 24.2 39.5 42.5 35.8 23.6 21.7 29.7 44.7 29.9 12
Cameras and Optics 17.4 17.6 27.1 30.6 22.7 13.7 13.2 17.0 31.2 15.1 387
Electronics 18.7 20.2 29.8 34.4 24.8 16.6 18.7 19.9 41.9 20.1 3,320
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 19.9 18.4 30.5 32.9 25.4 17.1 14.2 22.5 33.7 16.8 24
Furniture 19.7 18.8 29.9 33.0 26.5 15.7 14.2 18.4 34.3 15.8 78
Hardware 21.1 21.0 33.1 36.4 27.3 19.6 18.1 26.0 37.8 22.6 771
Health and Beauty 16.5 16.8 26.4 28.6 22.7 21.6 15.1 18.1 46.6 17.5 2,003
Home and Garden 24.9 25.5 39.8 42.6 34.8 21.3 32.9 25.8 59.6 36.9 1, 192
Luggage and Bags 19.1 17.2 29.2 30.6 25.6 18.8 15.2 22.9 32.9 22.9 334
Mature 50.7 55.8 90.9 90.9 73.0 53.8 45.6 78.6 90.9 73.0 1
Media 20.3 23.7 34.7 38.1 29.8 21.1 25.8 31.6 44.8 29.4 4,488
Office Supplies 31.6 32.4 50.6 53.7 43.7 31.8 33.3 45.9 59.3 44.9 191
Pet Supplies 34.0 33.5 52.7 55.3 48.4 34.8 32.5 47.8 59.2 44.3 232
Services 14.2 14.7 21.6 26.5 14.4 17.1 18.3 27.1 33.2 13.0 19
Software 12.5 12.2 18.8 22.5 14.9 11.3 13.7 13.0 36.4 9.6 201
Sporting Goods 14.3 13.2 21.7 23.6 18.8 14.0 11.6 16.1 27.2 16.1 957
Toys and Games 20.8 20.9 33.1 35.1 28.6 20.6 20.6 27.5 39.3 27.2 1,158
Vehicles and Parts 22.8 21.9 35.7 38.0 30.0 20.5 18.8 29.8 35.3 25.3 133
Not Classified 20.7 20.6 32.2 35.1 28.7 19.5 19.0 26.2 38.4 23.4 354
All Goods 19.4 20.4 31.3 34.3 26.7 18.6 19.8 23.1 41.8 23.0 17,715
Notes: This table reproduces Tables 8 and G14 by product category.
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F Price Rigidity Online versus Offline: Tables and Figures
Table F1. Frequency of Price Changes in Selected Narrow Categories, percent
Posted Prices Regular Prices
Online Online
No Between No Between
Weights Weights Offline Weights Weights Offline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Audio Players and Recorders 17.1 23.5 6.2 10.8 19.8 1.8
Bedding 20.0 17.1 10.1 12.5 13.3 1.3
Books 20.0 23.8 1.7 14.2 16.7 1.3
Camera Accessories 7.4 16.4 4.7 4.9 12.4 2.0
Cameras 17.6 34.9 5.2 15.6 30.3 2.7
Camping, Backpacking, and Hiking 13.3 18.0 3.4 7.8 14.5 1.1
Computer Software 12.1 23.8 2.8 7.7 19.1 2.0
Cookware 13.2 17.7 4.8 7.7 10.6 0.7
Costumes 10.8 13.2 7.2 6.1 7.3 0.9
Cycling 15.8 16.5 3.6 10.3 12.5 1.7
Doors and Windows 13.4 8.8 4.3 10.6 5.7 0.8
Gardening 12.5 12.8 2.3 6.8 9.1 1.3
Hair Care 14.3 22.4 5.2 9.7 14.7 1.7
Household Climate Control 11.3 15.7 3.7 7.0 11.1 0.8
Kitchen Appliances 13.4 13.2 5.7 9.3 10.6 0.9
Musical String Instruments 1.9 2.1 2.4 0.7 1.6 1.5
Oral Care 14.4 23.5 1.8 11.3 17.5 1.2
Tableware 11.1 17.6 5.2 6.3 16.1 0.7
Telephony 15.9 23.4 4.7 9.1 22.8 2.7
Vacuums 15.2 32.1 7.1 11.6 25.4 2.0
Vision Care 1.3 5.7 2.9 0.0 5.7 1.4
Watches 12.2 11.8 5.7 7.9 9.0 1.0
Panel B: United Kingdom
Books 25.9 20.9 6.1 19.9 17.2 4.5
Clothing Accessories 14.6 14.2 2.0 10.6 11.8 1.3
Electrical Appliances 32.9 20.2 7.4 24.6 17.2 5.4
Furniture and Furnishings 30.9 25.8 7.2 25.1 21.3 2.8
Games, Toys, and Hobbies 17.9 16.5 3.7 13.1 13.2 2.4
Garden Plants and Flowers 17.6 18.8 3.2 11.4 15.0 2.7
Garments 15.0 5.6 3.3 12.9 4.3 1.4
Household Textiles 40.2 21.3 5.2 31.8 15.2 2.5
Jewellery, Clocks, and Watches 17.1 15.4 2.5 12.5 11.9 1.5
Kitchenware 24.3 24.8 3.3 18.3 19.7 2.0
Pets 25.4 17.4 2.7 17.6 13.9 2.6
Pharmaceuticals 11.0 7.6 3.4 8.1 5.5 2.8
Recording Media 24.0 22.0 4.5 18.5 18.7 3.5
Repair of Dwelling 19.7 14.4 2.8 15.1 10.6 2.3
Spare Parts and Accessories 14.8 9.7 2.7 9.2 6.8 2.4
Spirits 1.3 1.4 9.4 1.3 1.2 7.5
Sport and Recreation Equipment 9.6 10.2 2.4 7.0 8.4 1.0
Tools and Equipment 18.5 15.7 2.4 14.2 12.4 1.9
Notes: The table compares the frequency of price changes for selected narrow categories in online data used in this paper and in
brick-and-mortar stores based on Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for the U.S. and Kryvtsov and Vincent (2014) for the U.K. Only
matched categories are shown.
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Table F2. Median Absolute Size of Price Changes in Selected Narrow Categories, log points
Posted Prices Regular Prices
Online Online
No Between No Between
Weights Weights Offline Weights Weights Offline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Audio Players and Recorders 15.1 11.5 9.7 14.5 11.4 12.6
Bedding 12.1 11.1 11.1 12.1 11.2 26.5
Books 20.0 16.9 10.2 19.7 16.9 15.5
Camera Accessories 13.2 11.3 9.0 13.5 11.7 19.4
Cameras 13.6 7.6 7.8 13.5 7.6 10.5
Camping, Backpacking, and Hiking 15.6 14.0 8.4 15.1 13.6 19.4
Computer Software 12.8 9.1 18.2 12.7 9.3 22.7
Cookware 14.1 16.1 8.7 13.2 12.6 32.3
Costumes 21.2 16.7 10.7 20.7 16.4 27.8
Cycling 6.3 8.0 7.2 6.3 8.0 11.1
Doors and Windows 7.8 11.3 8.7 7.5 10.9 29.0
Gardening 11.0 11.8 10.8 11.2 11.6 24.2
Hair Care 20.8 20.3 9.5 20.2 18.6 22.1
Household Climate Control 12.6 10.9 8.0 12.3 10.4 18.1
Kitchen Appliances 12.3 12.6 9.4 12.3 11.6 18.4
Musical String Instruments 16.4 10.8 8.4 16.4 11.3 13.9
Oral Care 23.2 17.2 10.1 19.7 15.2 12.8
Tableware 16.3 13.9 14.5 16.2 14.4 30.8
Telephony 16.5 14.6 13.7 16.3 14.9 22.2
Vacuums 11.7 12.3 8.7 11.6 12.1 13.5
Vision Care 15.4 14.5 7.5 15.3 14.6 18.3
Watches 13.0 11.9 8.6 13.1 11.8 41.9
Panel B: United Kingdom
Books 9.0 8.9 28.9 9.0 9.0 22.4
Clothing Accessories 8.1 8.1 22.9 7.6 7.7 16.1
Electrical Appliances 8.1 8.3 11.1 8.2 8.3 9.5
Furniture and Furnishings 6.6 6.8 23.0 6.5 6.9 21.2
Games, Toys, and Hobbies 16.8 17.1 19.7 16.5 16.8 17.2
Garden Plants and Flowers 11.6 12.6 23.3 11.9 12.8 19.2
Garments 6.8 6.8 26.4 6.8 6.8 21.7
Household Textiles 8.4 8.6 22.8 8.4 8.5 18.9
Jewellery, Clocks, and Watches 9.8 9.8 19.8 9.2 9.2 16.6
Kitchenware 10.0 10.1 24.1 9.7 9.8 19.1
Pets 5.8 5.8 9.5 5.8 5.7 6.9
Pharmaceuticals 12.3 12.3 18.1 11.9 11.9 11.4
Recording Media 8.2 8.4 24.1 7.8 8.0 19.9
Repair of Dwelling 8.6 9.3 15.2 8.9 9.8 12.0
Spare Parts and Accessories 10.2 10.5 10.9 8.7 8.6 10.1
Spirits 21.4 19.7 10.4 21.4 19.7 5.9
Sport and Recreation Equipment 11.1 11.2 21.9 10.9 11.0 18.8
Tools and Equipment 9.1 9.2 16.0 8.8 9.1 13.2
Notes: The table compares the absolute size of price changes for selected narrow categories in online data used in this paper and in
brick-and-mortar stores based on Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for the U.S. and Kryvtsov and Vincent (2014) for the U.K. Only
matched categories are shown.
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Table F3. Frequency and Size of Sales in Selected Narrow Categories
Frequency of Sales, percent Absolute Size of Sales, log points
Online Online
No Between No Between
Weights Weights Offline Weights Weights Offline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Audio Players and Recorders 1.2 1.9 4.8
Bedding 1.4 1.5 12.8
Books 1.2 1.3 0.8
Camera Accessories 0.4 1.5 3.2
Cameras 1.1 2.9 4.9
Camping, Backpacking, and Hiking 1.4 1.5 2.4
Computer Software 0.5 1.2 1.2
Cookware 1.2 1.8 6.0
Costumes 2.4 1.5 8.5
Cycling 1.1 0.9 3.9
Doors and Windows 0.5 1.0 5.5
Gardening 1.0 1.0 1.4
Hair Care 1.5 2.2 2.7
Household Climate Control 1.1 1.6 3.6
Kitchen Appliances 1.1 1.5 7.1
Musical String Instruments 0.4 0.5 2.7
Oral Care 0.9 1.1 0.5
Tableware 1.2 1.7 6.7
Telephony 1.5 1.6 2.8
Vacuums 1.0 3.1 8.2
Vision Care 0.2 0.3 2.0
Watches 1.1 1.3 8.0
Panel B: United Kingdom
Books 0.6 1.3 1.7 8.1 8.1 28.2
Clothing Accessories 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.7 27.9
Electrical Appliances 0.8 1.0 3.6 11.5 11.5 13.0
Furniture and Furnishings 0.5 1.3 5.3 22.3 22.3 24.6
Games, Toys, and Hobbies 0.9 1.0 1.4 19.5 19.6 22.5
Garden Plants and Flowers 0.7 1.3 0.6 10.8 10.8 25.3
Garments 0.9 0.5 1.9
Household Textiles 1.1 2.1 3.0
Jewellery, Clocks, and Watches 0.3 0.7 1.0 22.3 22.3 25.1
Kitchenware 1.0 2.5 1.3 12.8 12.8 26.0
Pets 1.4 0.9 0.3 16.4 16.4 16.5
Pharmaceuticals 0.5 0.9 0.7 2.9 2.9 27.2
Recording Media 0.9 1.5 1.1 10.6 9.9 29.9
Repair of Dwelling 0.5 1.5 0.6 9.4 9.4 21.4
Spare Parts and Accessories 1.0 0.4 0.4
Spirits 0.0 0.0 3.0
Sport and Recreation Equipment 0.3 0.5 1.5 20.1 20.1 23.9
Tools and Equipment 0.4 1.0 0.6 8.3 8.3 20.8
Notes: The table compares the frequency and absolute size of sales for selected narrow categories in online data used in this paper and in
brick-and-mortar stores based on Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for the U.S. and Kryvtsov and Vincent (2014) for the U.K. Only matched
categories are shown.
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G Additional Results: Selected Tables and Figures
Table G1. Frequency and Size of Price Changes, Longer Imputation Period
No Imputation Complete 90-Week Imputation
No Within Between No Within Between
Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 14.0 16.7 19.3 7.1 8.4 14.9
Implied duration, weeks 6.6 5.5 4.7 13.6 11.4 6.2
Median absolute size, log points 11.0 10.7 11.2
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 8.8 10.8 14.5 6.0 7.1 12.1
Implied duration, weeks 10.9 8.7 6.4 16.1 13.5 7.8
Median absolute size, log points 10.9 10.6 10.9
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 12.8 13.0 20.0 6.9 6.7 15.7
Implied duration, weeks 7.3 7.2 4.5 14.0 14.5 5.8
Median absolute size, log points 5.1 5.0 8.5
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 7.7 7.7 15.8 5.9 5.8 13.6
Implied duration, weeks 12.5 12.5 5.8 16.5 16.8 6.9
Median absolute size, log points 5.0 4.9 7.6
Notes: This table reproduces the results of Table 4 in the main text for the case when we allow for full imputation of missing
prices (up to the entire sample period) in columns (4)–(6).
Figure G1. Fraction of Imputed Missing Prices, Distribution over Goods
Panel A: United States
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Notes: The figure produces a histogram of the share of imputed missing prices over goods. The imputation procedure is based on the baseline filter described
in Section 3.1.
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Table G2. Frequency of Regular Price Changes, Alternative Imputation Schemes
No Click
Weights Weighted
(1) (2)
Panel A: United States
Sales break regular price spell (contiguous observations only) 12.3 16.2
Sales don’t break regular price spell (no missing price imputation) 8.8 14.5
Carry forward the last observed price if missing and no change later (missing-price imputation) 7.0 12.9
Carry forward the last observed price for missing AND sales 6.3 12.4
Panel B: United Kingdom
Sales break regular price spell (contiguous observations only) 11.1 17.8
Sales don’t break regular price spell (no missing price imputation) 7.7 15.8
Carry forward the last observed price if missing and no change later (missing-price imputation) 6.7 14.3
Carry forward the last observed price for missing AND sales 6.3 13.7
Notes: This table computes the frequency of regular price changes for the case when we allow carrying forward the last price for
missing prices and sales episodes. Rows 2 and 3 correspond to our baseline results in Table 4 in the main text.
Table G3. Synchronization of Sales
Across Sellers of the Same Good Across Goods by the Same Seller
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
No Imputation
No weights 0.8 5.2 0.0 2.1 9.6 0.0
Click weighted 1.8 4.7 0.2 2.1 1.0 2.4
With Imputation
No weights 1.1 6.6 0.0 2.7 10.8 0.0
Click weighted 1.6 3.7 0.3 2.2 1.1 2.7
Panel B: United Kingdom
No Imputation
No weights 1.0 6.4 0.0 2.7 11.1 0.0
Click weighted 1.3 3.2 0.0 2.3 5.8 2.0
With Imputation
No weights 0.8 5.5 0.0 3.7 14.2 0.0
Click weighted 1.9 5.3 0.1 2.1 3.4 2.1
Notes: Column (1) reports the mean synchronization of price changes across sellers, Column (2) the standard deviation of this measure across goods, and
Column (3) the synchronization for the median good. Columns (4)–(6) report the same statistics for the synchronization of price changes across goods.
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Table G4. Frequency of Price Increases and Decreases
Standard
Mean Deviation Median
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price Increases
No weights 8.3 9.7 5.9
Within-good weights 9.2 9.8 7.2
Between-good weights 8.9 5.4 8.6
Posted Price Decreases
No weights 9.5 11.0 6.5
Within-good weights 10.5 11.2 8.3
Between-good weights 10.9 6.9 10.1
Regular Price Increases
No weights 5.7 7.9 3.3
Within-good weights 6.4 8.1 4.2
Between-good weights 6.8 4.4 6.4
Regular Price Decreases
No weights 6.6 9.1 3.7
Within-good weights 7.4 9.4 4.8
Between-good weights 8.6 6.1 7.7
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price Increases
No weights 10.4 14.2 5.6
Within-good weights 10.5 14.2 5.7
Between-good weights 9.8 7.2 9.0
Posted Price Decreases
No weights 10.0 13.3 5.3
Within-good weights 10.2 13.4 5.4
Between-good weights 10.6 7.8 10.4
Regular Price Increases
No weights 7.8 12.6 2.3
Within-good weights 7.9 12.6 2.5
Between-good weights 8.0 6.6 7.2
Regular Price Decreases
No weights 7.4 11.6 1.7
Within-good weights 7.6 11.8 1.7
Between-good weights 8.7 7.2 8.1
Notes: This table shows the frequency of price increases and decreases.
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Figure G2. Distribution of Sellers by Number of Goods Listed
Panel A: United States, no weights
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
1 2-5 6-25 26-100 >100
Number of goods sold by a seller
Panel B: United States, click weighted
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
1 2-5 6-25 26-100 >100
Number of goods sold by a seller
Panel C: United Kingdom, no weights
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Notes: The figure shows that although a majority of the platform’s sellers have only a small number of goods listed, our click-weighted
results mostly come from large sellers that advertise hundreds of goods on the platform.
Table G5. Frequency and Size of Price Changes by Seller Size
Number of Goods by Seller
All Sellers 10 or fewer 11–100 More than 100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 19.3 5.3 5.8 21.1
Implied duration, weeks 4.7 18.5 16.8 4.2
Median absolute size, log points 11.2 14.2 7.7 11.2
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 14.5 3.2 4.3 16.1
Implied duration, weeks 6.4 30.5 22.8 5.7
Median absolute size, log points 10.9 12.6 7.4 11.0
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
Median frequency, percent 20.0 5.3 7.8 25.6
Implied duration, weeks 4.5 18.4 12.4 3.4
Median absolute size, log points 8.5 8.6 6.1 8.6
Regular Price
Median frequency, percent 15.8 4.1 7.1 20.0
Implied duration, weeks 5.8 23.9 13.5 4.5
Median absolute size, log points 7.6 8.6 6.0 7.1
Notes: The table reproduces Table 4 by seller size. The results confirm that our findings are overall representative for large
sellers. This pattern also holds within categories.
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Figure G3. Distribution of Frequency of Posted Price Change over Sellers
Panel A: United States
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Notes: The figure plots the distribution of the frequency of posted price change over sellers, by seller size.
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Figure G4. Hazard Function
Panel A: United States
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Notes: The figure plots the raw and click-weighted hazard rates.
Table G6. The Size of Price Increases vs. Price Decreases, log points
Standard
Mean Deviation Median
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: United States
All Price Changes
No weights 16.3 17.2 11.0
Within-good weights 16.3 17.4 10.7
Between-good weights 13.7 9.8 11.2
Price Increases
No weights 17.5 18.3 11.8
Within-good weights 17.3 18.6 11.3
Between-good weights 13.9 10.7 11.2
Price Decreases
No weights 15.4 17.0 10.3
Within-good weights 15.6 17.4 10.1
Between-good weights 13.6 10.4 10.8
Panel B: United Kingdom
All Price Changes
No weights 9.5 13.2 5.1
Within-good weights 9.7 13.5 5.0
Between-good weights 10.1 8.0 8.5
Price Increases
No weights 9.9 13.6 5.3
Within-good weights 9.9 13.8 5.1
Between-good weights 9.8 8.6 8.0
Price Decreases
No weights 9.4 13.5 4.7
Within-good weights 9.6 13.9 4.7
Between-good weights 10.4 8.6 7.7
Notes: This table reproduces the size of price changes for posted prices from Table 4, sepa-
rately for price increases and decreases.
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Figure G5. Distribution of the Absolute Size of Posted Price Change over Sellers
Panel A: United States
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
Sellers with 1 product
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
2-5 products
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
6-25 products
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
26-100 products
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
>100 products
0
.1
.2
.3
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
All sellers
Panel B: United Kingdom
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
Sellers with 1 product
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
2-5 products
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
6-25 products
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
26-100 products
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
>100 products
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f s
el
le
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Abs. size of dp, %
All sellers
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of the absolute size of posted price change over sellers, by seller size. Changes over 100 percent are shown as 100
percent.
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Table G7. Duration of Product Life, weeks
Truncated Halftruncated Nontruncated Lower Bound
Share, Share, Standard Standard Number
percent percent Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Median Mean Median of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: All Products
U.S. 8.5 41.5 51.7 26.2 25.3 24.1 19 42.1 42.3 52, 776
U.K. 1.7 31.5 38.3 26.3 15.5 19.7 4 24.0 16.2 52, 767
Panel B: Apparel and Accessories with One Seller
U.S. 0.0 16.0 25.1 23.7 11.0 15.1 2 13.3 4.4 780
U.K. 0.0 17.3 21.5 23.1 7.7 12.5 1 10.1 2.7 1, 413
Panel C: Apparel with One Seller, Excluding Jewelry and Watches
U.S. 0.0 15.0 16.7 19.4 8.7 12.5 2 9.9 3.2 354
U.K. 0.0 21.6 16.3 18.7 5.5 9.0 1 7.8 2.6 575
Notes: Column (1) reports the share of goods with unobserved entry and exit (truncated from both sides), while Column (2), truncated from either side (but
not both). A good entry (exit) is truncated if it enters (exits) within the first (last) five weeks. Columns (3) and (4) report the mean and standard deviation of
life duration for halftruncated goods, while Columns (5)–(7), the mean, standard deviation, and median for nontruncated goods. Columns (8) and (9) show
the lower bound of the mean and median life duration, respectively (see the text), and Column (10) the total number of goods. To compare, the mean (median)
duration in Cavallo, Neiman, and Rigobon (2014) for the U.S. sample is 37 (15) weeks; for H&M and Zara only, the mean and median duration are all in the
interval of 10–12 weeks.
Table G8. Price Stickiness by Duration of Product Life
No Weights Click Weighted
Frequency, percent Duration Frequency, percent Duration
Duration of Standard of Spells, Standard of Spells, Number
Product Life Mean Deviation Median weeks Mean Deviation Median weeks of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: United States
Less than six months 18.4 22.9 11.9 7.9 19.6 17.8 17.1 5.3 1,262
Six months to a year 17.8 18.7 13.6 6.8 18.2 13.4 16.4 5.6 1,961
More than one year 17.9 17.4 14.1 6.6 18.1 11.4 17.0 5.4 1,593
Panel B: United Kingdom
Less than six months 22.6 29.2 11.1 8.5 19.6 23.0 14.3 6.5 988
Six months to a year 20.7 25.5 12.1 7.7 18.8 17.5 16.8 5.5 912
More than one year 19.8 21.6 12.5 7.5 19.7 14.3 20.7 4.3 459
Notes: The table reports the frequency of price adjustment and the duration of spells for goods with nontruncated product lives (i.e., goods which appear for
the first time after our sample period starts and exit the market before the end of our sample period). To account for possible sample truncation, we drop
products that enter or exit within the first or last five weeks of our data. Columns (1)–(3) report the mean, standard deviation, and median frequency of
price adjustment across goods with a specified duration of life, Column (4) the corresponding implied duration of price spells, Columns (5)–(8) the same
statistics with between-good click weights, and Column (9) the number of goods. We find little support for the idea that product life is a major determinant
of price rigidity in our data.
Table G9. Synchronization Rate Based on the Fraction of Price Changes, percent
Synchronization across Sellers Synchronization across Goods
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Posted Price
No weights 2.0 1.0 1.7 2.6 1.5 2.3
Within weights 2.0 1.0 1.7 2.7 1.5 2.4
Between weights 1.7 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.4 0.9
Regular Price
No weights 2.3 1.2 2.1 2.9 1.6 2.6
Within weights 2.4 1.2 2.1 3.0 1.6 2.6
Between weights 2.0 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.0
Panel B: United Kingdom
Posted Price
No weights 1.8 1.1 1.7 2.5 1.4 2.2
Within weights 1.8 1.1 1.7 2.6 1.4 2.3
Between weights 1.8 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.4
Regular Price
No weights 2.1 1.2 1.9 2.7 1.5 2.4
Within weights 2.1 1.2 1.9 2.8 1.5 2.5
Between weights 2.1 1.1 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.6
Notes: This table reports an alternative measure of synchronization relative to the one in Table 6. This measure defines syn-
chronization as a ratio of the standard deviation of the fraction of price changes over time to its mean over time (coefficient
of variation), in percent. Zero means no synchronization (Calvo).
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Figure G6. Synchronization of Regular Price Changes by Time Horizon
Panel A: United States, for good over sellers
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Panel B: United States, for seller over goods
0
20
40
60
80
100
Sy
n
ch
ro
n
iz
at
io
n
 r
at
e,
 %
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Time horizon, weeks
No weights Calvo process
Within sellers Cumul. hazard
Between sellers
Panel C: United Kingdom, for good over sellers
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Panel D: United Kingdom, for seller over goods
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Notes: The figure reproduces Figure 2 for regular prices.
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Table G10. Frequency and Synchronization of Posted-Price Increases and Decreases
No Weights Click Weighted
Standard Standard Number
Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: United States
Frequency of
Price changes 17.8 17.4 14.0 19.8 11.2 19.3 14,483
Price increases 8.3 9.7 5.9 8.9 5.4 8.6 14,483
Price decreases 9.5 11.0 6.5 10.9 6.9 10.1 14,483
Cross-Seller Synchronization of
Price changes 10.2 18.6 0.0 15.7 10.0 15.1 9,937
Price increases 5.4 14.4 0.0 6.6 5.5 6.3 8,281
Price decreases 5.9 14.7 0.0 9.8 7.2 10.3 8,365
Cross-Good Synchronization of
Price changes 17.2 27.4 1.6 22.5 11.6 24.9 2,344
Price increases 11.9 23.5 0.0 10.0 5.6 13.0 1,897
Price decreases 11.1 22.1 0.0 13.4 6.9 17.5 1,765
Panel B: United Kingdom
Frequency of
Price changes 20.4 24.1 12.8 20.4 13.8 20.0 6,623
Price increases 10.4 14.2 5.6 9.8 7.2 9.0 6,623
Price decreases 10.0 13.3 5.3 10.6 7.8 10.4 6,623
Cross-Seller Synchronization of
Price changes 14.7 24.8 0.0 17.9 11.1 17.9 3,867
Price increases 8.7 19.2 0.0 8.3 7.1 8.1 3,122
Price decreases 8.4 19.1 0.0 11.1 8.8 10.3 3,066
Cross-Good Synchronization of
Price changes 19.7 26.5 8.2 26.1 16.7 26.0 1,258
Price increases 14.3 23.7 3.3 13.2 9.5 15.3 1,045
Price decreases 12.1 20.9 0.9 15.1 9.3 16.4 1,012
Notes: The table reports estimates of the frequency and synchronization of posted-price increases and decreases. See notes to Tables 4 and 6.
Table G11. Frequency and Synchronization of Regular Price Increases and Decreases
No Weights Between Weights
Standard Standard Number
Mean Deviation Median Mean Deviation Median of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: United States
Frequency of
Price changes 12.3 14.0 8.8 15.4 9.5 14.5 16,332
Price increases 5.7 7.9 3.3 6.8 4.4 6.4 16,332
Price decreases 6.6 9.1 3.7 8.6 6.1 7.7 16,332
Cross-Seller Synchronization of
Price changes 7.8 16.4 0.0 12.8 8.6 12.6 10,280
Price increases 4.3 12.9 0.0 5.4 5.1 4.5 8,445
Price decreases 4.6 12.9 0.0 8.3 6.5 8.4 8,554
Cross-Good Synchronization of
Price changes 14.7 25.7 0.0 18.3 10.3 20.3 2,422
Price increases 10.4 22.0 0.0 8.1 4.9 10.7 1,926
Price decreases 9.9 21.2 0.0 11.1 6.4 14.6 1,773
Panel B: United Kingdom
Frequency of
Price changes 15.2 21.1 7.7 16.7 12.6 15.8 7,738
Price increases 7.8 12.6 2.3 8.0 6.6 7.2 7,738
Price decreases 7.4 11.6 1.7 8.7 7.2 8.1 7,738
Cross-Seller Synchronization of
Price changes 12.1 22.9 0.0 15.6 10.5 14.3 4,005
Price increases 7.2 17.5 0.0 7.4 6.7 7.4 3,200
Price decreases 7.1 17.6 0.0 10.0 8.7 9.6 3,102
Cross-Good Synchronization of
Price changes 16.6 24.7 5.0 22.4 15.3 21.2 1,306
Price increases 12.3 21.7 1.1 11.4 9.0 12.5 1,071
Price decreases 10.3 18.8 0.0 13.0 8.5 12.9 1,024
Notes: The table reproduces Table G10 for regular prices.
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Table G13. Predictors of Frequency of Sales
Filter: One Week Filter Two Week Filter
Imputation: Without With Without With
Weights: No Between No Between No Between No Between
Predictors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: United States
Log number of sellers 0.74∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Concentration, Herfindahl index, (0, 1] 1.48∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 2.59∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ 2.09∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.18) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28) (0.24)
Log total clicks −0.30∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Log median price −0.01 −0.04 0.03 −0.03 −0.09 −0.13 0.03 −0.10
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14)
Log median price, squared −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Share of price points −0.04 −0.09 0.24∗∗ 0.16 −0.08 −0.16 0.33∗∗ 0.23
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
N 10,567 10,567 21,452 21,452 10,518 10,518 21,291 21,291
Panel B: United Kingdom
Log number of sellers 0.15 0.33∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Concentration, Herfindahl index, (0, 1] 0.59∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.34) (0.29) (0.29) (0.46) (0.51) (0.36) (0.39)
Log total clicks 0.05 0.04 0.04 −0.03 0.01 −0.00 0.10∗∗ −0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Log median price 0.24 0.25 −0.10 −0.05 0.12 0.17 −0.13 −0.05
(0.17) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13)
Log median price, squared −0.03∗∗ −0.04∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.02∗ −0.03∗ 0.00 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Share of price points −0.54∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.52∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗ −0.69∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
N 4,464 4,464 10,754 10,754 4,440 4,440 10,651 10,651
Notes: The table presents the determinants of the frequency of sales.
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Table G14. Average Dispersion of Posted Prices across Sellers (Alternative Measures)
Coefficient Standard Devia- Value of Interquartile
of Variation, tion of Log Price Information, Range, Range, Gap, Number
percent log points log points log points log points log points of Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: United States, actual prices
No weights 21.5 23.6 24.4 34.6 40.7 27.6
29,753Within-good weights 21.4 22.9 23.3 32.0 40.7 27.6
Between-good weights 19.9 20.3 24.8 26.1 50.1 21.1
Panel B: United States, prices net of seller fixed effects
No weights 21.2 18.3 31.2 36.8 25.1
29,753Within-good weights 20.7 17.5 28.9 36.8 25.1
Between-good weights 17.5 18.6 22.5 43.8 18.8
Panel C: United Kingdom, actual prices
No weights 19.4 21.3 20.4 31.3 34.3 26.7
17,715Within-good weights 19.4 20.7 19.2 28.8 34.3 26.7
Between-good weights 18.6 18.6 19.8 23.1 41.8 23.0
Panel D: United Kingdom, prices net of seller fixed effects
No weights 16.5 13.3 24.2 26.9 20.4
17,715Within-good weights 16.0 12.6 22.2 26.9 20.4
Between-good weights 14.9 14.5 17.9 35.2 18.1
Notes: Columns (1)–(6) report the average price dispersion for posted prices measured with the CV, std(log p), VI, IQR, range, and gap, respectively. Column
(7) reports the number of goods. The CV is computed as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. The value of information (VI) is the log difference
between the average and minimum price. (It can be interpreted as the maximum markup a risk-neutral consumer would be willing to pay to obtain infor-
mation about the seller with the best price versus buying from a seller picked at random). The interquartile range (IQR) is computed as the log difference
between the 75th and 25th percentile; the range as the log difference between the highest and lowest price; and the gap as the log difference between the
two lowest prices. See Table 8 in the main text.
Figure G7. Cross-Seller Dispersion of Posted Prices Net of Seller Effects over Product Life
Panel A: United States
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Notes: The figure plots the raw and click-weighted mean over goods of the standard deviation of log price, net of seller fixed effects, for posted prices against
the time passed since the product introduction. Goods introduced during the first seven weeks are cut off to account for truncated observations, and only
goods with duration of life of more than a year are considered. To construct this figure, we drop one outlier, a product in Media, which would cause an
idiosyncratic spike in the U.S. click-weighted CV at week 44.
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Figure G8. Is Price Dispersion Spatial or Temporal?
Panel A: United States, no weights
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Panel D: United Kingdom, click weighted
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Notes: For each price line (a time-series of prices for a good-seller), we compute the share of sample period spent in each of the 4 quartiles of cross-seller
price distribution. This exercise is similar to Figure 4 of Lach (2002). The figure then shows the distribution across price lines. Table 9 quantifies the height
of the first (<5%) and the last (>95%) bars for each panel.
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Table G16. Predictors of Posted Price Dispersion, by measure
Coefficient Standard Devia- Value of Interquartile
of Variation, tion of Log Price Information, Range, Range, Gap,
percent log points log points log points log points log points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: United States
Log number of sellers −2.88∗∗∗ −3.49∗∗∗ −2.89 −2.36∗∗ −3.44 −7.88∗∗∗
(0.82) (1.01) (1.75) (1.16) (2.47) (1.87)
Log total clicks 4.68∗∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗ 8.78∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗ 16.80∗∗∗ 5.46∗∗∗
(0.80) (0.91) (1.69) (1.33) (2.37) (1.33)
Log median price −3.79∗∗∗ −3.85∗∗∗ −5.59∗∗∗ −4.08∗∗∗ −9.77∗∗∗ −3.65∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.48) (0.87) (0.54) (1.11) (0.81)
Share of price points −6.27∗∗∗ −6.96∗∗∗ −9.27∗∗∗ −8.19∗∗∗ −15.68∗∗∗ −6.42∗∗
(1.44) (1.75) (3.23) (2.01) (4.17) (2.91)
Frequency of regular price changes 0.31∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.10)
Absolute size of regular price changes 0.23∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08)
Frequency of sales −0.23∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12)
Absolute size of sales 0.25∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Synchronization of posted price changes −0.02 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
R2 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.22
N 3,349 3,349 3,349 3,349 3,349 3,349
Panel B: United Kingdom
Log number of sellers −7.01∗∗∗ −5.40∗∗∗ −2.81 −3.28∗ −10.76∗∗∗ −10.81∗∗∗
(1.51) (1.42) (1.93) (1.69) (2.86) (2.65)
Log total clicks 3.90∗∗∗ 2.92∗∗∗ 4.25∗∗∗ 1.06 14.00∗∗∗ 5.11∗∗∗
(0.81) (0.77) (1.41) (1.10) (2.22) (1.80)
Log median price −3.58∗∗∗ −3.00∗∗∗ −3.83∗∗∗ −3.00∗∗∗ −7.67∗∗∗ −3.23∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.40) (0.62) (0.53) (0.96) (0.58)
Share of price points −1.79 −1.28 −3.15 −2.26 −1.79 −4.07
(2.05) (1.82) (2.19) (2.30) (4.25) (2.60)
Frequency of regular price changes 0.14∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10)
Absolute size of regular price changes 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.17∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10)
Frequency of sales −0.30∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗ −0.19 −0.29∗∗ −0.24 −0.29∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13)
Absolute size of sales 0.25∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.34∗∗
(0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.20) (0.16)
Synchronization of posted price changes −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
R2 0.29 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.19
N 840 840 840 840 840 840
Notes: The table reproduces Column (6) of Table 10 for different measures of price dispersion.
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